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The proper relationship of federal labor law and federal antitrust
law has confounded the judiciary since the enactment of the first
federal antitrust statutes. Our national labor policy encourages
collective bargaining as the best means of promoting industrial
peace. One of the underlying foundations of free collective bargain-
ing is labor's capability to affect management's competitive posi-
tion in the marketplace by means of strikes, boycotts, and worker
organization.' Viewed in the context of the collective bargaining
process, the national policies favoring collective bargaining create
tensions with the policies favoring an unrestrained marketplace,
which form the foundation of federal antitrust laws.
With varying results, courts have struggled over issues such as the
merits of exempting unions from antitrust regulation, the proper
extent of this labor exemption, and the degree of scrutiny to be given
collective bargaining agreements. In cases involving significant
labor considerations and slight antitrust implications courts have
found paramount the national policies favoring collective bargain-
ing and have granted immunity or applied a labor exemption. Con-
versely, in cases involving significant market restraints and only
tangentially affecting labor interests courts have applied the anti-
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trust laws. Because no case has arisen with major labor and anti-
trust implications, the proper relationship between the fundamen-
tal national policies reflected in these laws never has been defined.
Consideration of this important issue may occur in the context of
challenges to the player restraint system in the professional sports
industry. Professional athletic teams are similar to other enterprises
engaged in selling an entertainment package to the public. Virtually
every major public policy towards business-antitrust, labor rela-
tions, taxation, race and sex discrimination-has a potentially sig-
nificant application to sports. Yet, for many years professional
sports were not recognized for what they were, a big business. An
age of innocence contributed to a low player salary structure, to an
advantageous tax treatment for team owners, and to a virtual im-
munity for professional sports' legal arrangements from antitrust
challenges. This tolerance is vanishing quickly, however; players,
Congress, courts, and the public have become restless with the ex-
isting power structure in the professional sports world. Senator Sam
Ervin articulated the changed attitude in 1972, when he com-
plained:
[h]ow callously professional sports will deny a man his right to
a livelihood because he did not wish to play for a particular team
at a dictated salary, or how quickly a franchise will be shifted,
thereby denying fans the opportunity to see their favorites ...
Even if I believed the solemn predictions of the pro sports indus-
try spokesman, and I don't, I would still oppose a system that
demands lord-like control over the serf-like hired hands in order
to guarantee survival of the pro teams.'
Despite this change in perception, the road to a reconciliation
between the divergent interests represented by athletes, sports
teams, the antitrust laws, and the labor laws is strewn with obsta-
cles. New player control systems arising from collective bargaining
agreements place significant market restaints on aspiring profes-
sional athletes and certainly will be challenged in court. Before
considering the antitrust issues, however, courts must decide
whether these collective bargaining agreements are subject to anti-
trust scrutiny. In discussing the latter issue, this Article examines
2. Hearings before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 244 (1972).
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the applicability of federal antitrust law to professional sports, ana-
lyzes the development of labor exemptions and immunities and
their relevance in the sports industry, and identifies the issues perti-
nent to a consideration of whether the current collective bargaining
agreement between the National Football League Players Associa-
tion (NFLPA) and the National Football League Management
Council, which includes a new player restraint system, should be
immune from antitrust attack.
ANTITRUST AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS: AN OvERVIEW3
Until recently, very little litigation concerned the market freedom
of professional athletes and the applicability of the antitrust laws
to the professional sports industry. The Supreme Court in 1922 first
considered these issues in regard to professional baseball. The Court
concluded in Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of
Professional Baseball Clubs4 that the sport was immune from anti-
trust attack because baseball games were not interstate commerce5
and "although made for money would not be called trade or com-
merce in the commonly accepted use of those words."6 In 1953 the
Court in Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc. 7 reaffirmed baseball's
exemption from the federal antitrust lawss on the rationale that for
thirty years baseball had developed free from those laws and that
any change in the status quo was within the province of Congress
rather than the courts.9 Finally, in 1972 the Court acknowledged in
Flood v. Kuhn"0 that baseball was a business engaged in interstate
3. For an in-depth analysis of this subject, see L. SoBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTs AND THE LAW
(1977).
4. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
5. "The business is giving exhibitions of baseball which are purely state affairs." Id. at 208.
6. Id. at 209.
7. 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam).
8. Id. at 357.
9. Id. Moreover, the Court noted that Congress, after Federal Baseball Club, had declined
the opportunity to amend the pertinent statutes. Id. Also noteworthy is that the Court
decided Toolson subsequent to its broadening of the concept of interstate commerce. See
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Martin, The Aftermath of Flood
v. Kuhn: Professional Baseball's Exemption from Antitrust Regulation, 3 W. STATE U.L. REV.
262 (1976).
10. 407 U.S. 258 (1972). Flood, an outstanding professional baseball player with 12 years
experience for the St. Louis Cardinals, was traded to the Philadelphia Phillies without being
consulted about nor informed of the trade until its consummation. After unsuccessfully
petitioning the Commissioner of Baseball to classify him as a free agent, Flood initiated an
19781
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:395
commerce; nevertheless, relying on Federal BaseballClub and
Toolson, the Court reaffirmed the exemption of baseball's reserve
system" from the Sherman Act.'"
antitrust action against organized baseball, asserting that Toolson and Federal Baseball Club
should be overruled. Id. at 264-66.
11. Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court in Flood presented a comprehensive descrip-
tion of baseball's former reserve system:
The reserve system, publicly introduced into baseball contracts in 1887 ...
centers in the uniformity of player contracts; the confinement of the player to
the club that has him under the contract; the assignability of the player's
contract; and the ability of the club annually to renew the contract unilaterally,
subject to a stated salary minimum. Thus
A. Rule 3 of the Major League Rules provides in part:
"(a) UNIFORM CONTRACT. To preserve morale and to produce the similar-
ity of conditions necessary to keen competition, the contracts between all clubs
and their players in the Major Leagues shall be in a single form which shall be
prescribed by the Major League Executive Council. No club shall make a con-
tract different from the uniform contract or a contract containing a non-reserve
clause, except with the written approval of the Commissioner .
"(g) TAMPERING. To preserve discipline and competition, and to prevent
the enticement of players, coaches, managers and umpires, there shall be no
negotiations or dealings respecting employment, either present or prospective,
between any player, coach or manager and any club other than the club with
which he is under contract or acceptance of terms, or by which he is reserved,
or which has the player on its Negotiation List, or between any umpire and any
league other than the league with which he is under contract or acceptance of
terms, unless the club or league with which he is connected shall have, in
writing, expressly authorized such negotiations or dealings prior to their comm-
encement."
B. Rule 9 of the Major League Rules provides in part:
"(a) NOTICE. A club may assign to another club an existing contract with a
player. The player, upon receipt of written notice of such assignment, is by his
contract bound to serve the assignee.
"After the date of such assignment of rights and obligations of the assignor
clubs thereunder shall become the rights and obligations of the assignee club
C. Rules 3 and 9 of the Professional Baseball Rules contain provisions paral-
lel to those just quoted.
D. The Uniform Player's Contract provides in part:
"4.(a) . . . The Player agrees that, in addition to other remedies, the Club
shall be entitled to injunctive and other equitable relief to prevent a breach of
this contract by the Player, including, among others, the right to enjoin the
Player from playing baseball for any other person or organization during the
term of this contrct."
"5.(a) The Player agrees that, while under contract, and prior to expiration
of the Club's right to renew this contract, he will not play baseball otherwise
than for the Club, except that the Player may participate in post-season games
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In the interim between Federal Baseball Club and Flood, the
Supreme Court and its individual Justices rendered decisions sub-
jecting professional boxing, 3 football," and basketball 5 to the fed-
eral antitrust laws." As a result, litigation and controversy focused
under the conditions prescribed in the Major League Rules... "
"8.(a) The Player agrees that this contract maybe assigned by the Club (and
reassigned by any assignee Club) to any other Club in accordance with the
Major League Rules and the Professional Baseball Rules.
"10.(a) On or before January 15 (or if a Sunday, then the next preceding
business day) of the year next following the last playing season covered by this
contract, the Club may tender to the Player a contract for the term of that year
by mailing the same to the Player at his address following his signature hereto,
or if none be given, then at his last address of record with the Club. If prior to
the March 1 next succeeding said January 15, the Player and the Club have not
agreed upon the terms of such contract, then on or before 10 days after said
March 1, the Club shall have the right by written notice to the Player at said
address to renew this contract for the period of one year on the same terms,
except that the amount payable to the Player shall be such as the club shall fix
in said notice; provided, however, that said amount, if fixed by a Major League
Club, shall be an amount payable at a rate not less than 80% of the rate stipu-
lated for the preceding year.
"(b) The Club's right to renew this contract, as provided in subparagraph
(a) of this paragraph 10, and the promise of the Player not to play otherwise
than with the Club have been taken into consideration in determining the
amount payable under paragraph 2 hereof."
407 U.S. at 259 n.1 (citation omitted).
12. Id. at 285. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), provides in pertinent
part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to
be illegal." Section 2 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), provides in pertinent part: "Every
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony ....
Although baseball has remained exempt from the federal antitrust laws, this peculiar
immunity ironically has not prevented upheavals in the sport's player restraint systems.
Relying on arbitration, professional baseball players have achieved a degree of freedom com-
parable to that possessed by athletes competing in other major professional team sports. See
Note, Professional Sports: Restraining the League Commissioner's Prerogatives in an Era of
Player Mobility, 19 WM. & MARY L. REv. 281, 297-300 (1977). See also L. SOBEL, supra note
3, at 197-218.
13. United States v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc., 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
14. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
15. Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1971).
16. Recognizing the Court's disparate treatment of the various professional sports, Justice
Blackmun stated in Flood that baseball's exemption was an anomaly,
an aberration that has been with us now for half a century, one heretofore
deemed fully entitled to the benefit of stare decisis, and one that has survived
the Court's expanding concept of interstate commerce . ...
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on the validity of the player control mechanisms used in those sports
lacking baseball's immunity. These control mechanisms were simi-
lar to professional baseball's reserve system, which as a consequence
of its adoption by the nation's oldest organized professional sport,
had served as a prototype for the player restraints used in other
sports. Antitrust challenges to player restraints emanated from two
sources: adversary leagues competing for athletes within a limited
labor market and players attempting to increase their options in
contract negotiations with club owners.
Professional basketball was the first sport whose player restraint
system was scrutinized closely under the antitrust law. Tradition-
ally, courts had resolved possible antitrust conflicts arising from
that sport's Uniform Player Contract by holding that the National
Basketball Association's (NBA) option clause," which ambiguously
provided that a team had the right to renew a player's prior contract
for one year with substantially "the same terms" as those existing
in the previous year, should be regarded as exercisable for only one
year rather than in perpetuity.'" Moreover, a player could satisfy the
option clause either by playing out or by sitting out his option year. 9
Other professional sports operating interstate-football, boxing, basketball,
and, presumably, hockey and golf-are not so exempt.
407 U.S. at 282-83 (footnotes omitted).
17. The NBA's option clause provided:
On or before September first next following the last playing season covered by
this contract and renewals and extensions thereof, the club may tender to the
Player a contract for the next succeeding season . . . .If the Player fails, neg-
lects, or omits to sign and return such contract to the Club so that the Club
receives it on or before October first next succeeding, then this contract would
be deemed renewed and extended for the period of one year upon the same terms
and conditions in all respects as are provided herein, except that the compensa-
tion payable to the Player would be the same provided in the contract tendered
to the Player pursuant to the provisions hereof, which compensation would in
no event be less than 75% of the compensation payable to the Player for the last
playing season covered by this contract and renewals and extensions thereof.
The Club's right to renew this contract, as herein provided, and the promise
of the Player not to play otherwise than for the Club and its assignees, have been
taken into consideration in determining the amount of compensation payable
under paragraph two hereof.
NBA Uniform Player Contract 24.
18. Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 275 Cal. App. 2d 671, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1969); Central New York
Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett, 19 Ohio Op. 2d 130, 181 N.E.2d 506 (C.P. Cuyahoga County
1961). See L. SOBEL, supra note 3, at 137-44.
19. Compare Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 275 Cal. App. 2d 671, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1969)(basket-
ball) with Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc. v. Harris, 348 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App.
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In 1971, however, Spencer Haywood, a skilled basketball player,
challenged the validity of certain components of the NBA's player
draft and reserve clause, particularly its four-year rule0 denying
players eligibility as draftees until the graduation of their college
class." A federal district court in Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Man-
1961)(football). See L. SosE, supra note 3, at 145-46. Additionally, the court actually en-
forced basketball's one-year option clause in Washington Capital's Basketball Club, Inc. v.
Barry, 419 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1969).
20. By-Laws of the National Basketball Association § 2.05 provided:
High School Graduate, etc. A person who has not completed high school or who
has completed high school but has not entered college shall not be eligible to
be drafted or to be a Player until four years after he has been graduated or four
years after his original high school class has been graduated, as the case may
be, nor may the future services of any such person be negotiated or contracted
for, or otherwise reserved. Similarly, a person who has entered college but is no
longer enrolled, shall not be eligible to be drafted or to be a Player until the time
when he would have first become eligible had he remained enrolled in college.
Any negotiations or agreements with any such person during such period shall
be null and void and shall confer no rights whatsoever; nor shall a Member
violating the provisions of this paragraph be permitted to acquire the rights to
the services of such person at any time thereafter.
Section 6.03 provided:
Persons Eligible for Draft. The following classes of persons shall be eligible for
the annual draft:
(a) Students in four year colleges whose classes are to be graduated during
the June following the holding of the draft;
(b) Students in four year colleges whose original classes have already been
graduated, and who do not choose to exercise remaining collegiate basketball
eligibility;
(c) Students in four year colleges whose original classes have already been
graduated if such students have no remaining collegiate basketball eligibility;
(d) Persons who become eligible pursuant to the provisions of Section 2.05
of these By-laws.
21. Haywood was voted Rookie of the Year and Most Valuable Player of the American
Basketball Association (ABA) for the 1969-70 season, following which he renegotiated his
contract with the ABA's Denver Rockets. Although Denver represented that it would give
Haywood a six year, $1,900,000 contract, it ultimately tendered to Hiywood a standard
contract providing only $394,000 in compensation. Nevertheless, Haywood signed, purport-
edly relying on the Denver managers' representations that the contract furnished compensa-
tion of $1,900,000, as negotiated. After learning of the inconsistency, Haywood unsuccessfully
attempted to renegotiate and then voided his contract "by reason of fraudulent misrepresen-
tations." Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1053 (C.D. Cal.
1971). Denver thereafter filed suit to force Haywood to play basketball for it through the 1975-
76 season and to enjoin him from playing for any other team. Contending that his contract
with Denver was rescinded, Haywood entered into a new agreement with the NBA's Seattle
Supersonics. The Commissioner of the NBA, however, voided this contract, which was in
violation of the four-year rule. Id. at 1056; see note 20 supra. Haywood counterclaimed that
the NBA was engaging in an unlawful restraint of trade and sought an injunction allowing
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agement, Inc.2 2 concluded that the four-year rule constituted a
group boycott, a concerted refusal to deal, that was a per se violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act.Y
In determining the applicability of the per se standard, the court
found that the contested action was outside the scope of the excep-
tion enunciated by the Supreme Court in Silver v. New York Stock
Exchange,4 within which a market restraint could be evaluated
under a rule of reason standard. To qualify his actions for the exten-
sive review provided by the Silver exception, the district court con-
cluded that an antitrust defendant had to establish three factors:
first, that the legislative or market structure of the particular indus-
try mandated self-regulation; second, that the collective action was
intended to accomplish an end consistent with the policy justifying
self-regulation, was reasonably related to that goal, and was no more
extensive than necessary; and third, that the collective group pro-
vided procedural safeguards for anyone harmed by their action.2
The NBA's four-year rule lacked the notice and hearing provisions
necessary for it to receive a rule of reason evaluation; thus, the court
granted Haywood a partial summary judgment, declaring the rule
a per se antitrust violation."
him to play for Seattle. 325 F. Supp. at 1054. Granting Haywood's request, the district court
issued a preliminary injunction, id. at 1067, which subsequently was upheld by Justice Doug-
las, sitting as Circuit Justice. Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
The district court also ordered that a "partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff Hay-
wood be granted, to the limited extent of ruling that the NBA's four-year college rule. . . is
a violation. . . of the Sherman Act." 325 F. Supp. at 1066-67. See generally L. SOBEL, supra
note 3, at 447-69.
22. 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal.), stay vacated sub nom. Haywood v. National Basketball
Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1971).
23. Id. at 1066-67. For the pertinent text of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970),
see note 12 supra.
24. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
25. See 325 F. Supp. at 1065.
26. Id. at 1066-67; see note 21 supra. A complete analysis of the standard under which
courts should review alleged antitrust violations in situations involving professional sports is
beyond the scope of this Article. The judiciary has not fully resolved this issue. As recognized
by the court in Denver Rockets, two possible standards of review could be implemented: the
rule of reason or the per se test. Under a rule of reason evaluation a court must determine
whether the particular restraint of trade places an undue burden on competition. See, e.g.,
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977); Chicago Bd. of Trade
v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39, 241 (1918); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911). Such an analysis, which requires the court to weigh the prospective costs
and benefits of the activity in question, generally necessitates extensive discovery of intricate
economic data, which then is presented in a long, expensive, and elaborate trial. Relieving
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A second major challenge to professional basketball's player re-
straint system arose in a 1975 suit by the player representatives of
the fourteen NBA teams, who alleged that the NBA's college draft,
its Uniform Player Contract reserve clause, and its compensation
plan (analogous to the National Football League's Rozelle Rule)"
were illegal, anticompetitive restraints. In Robertson v. National
Basketball Association" the court denied the defendant NBA's mo-
tion for summary judgment and the defendant American Basketball
Association's (ABA) motion to dissolve a preliminary injunction
against an NBA-ABA merger granted earlier to the plaintiffs.21 The
court declined to grant summary judgment for the plaintiffs because
of the uncertainty over whether the disputed control mechanisms
"came into being in the context of arm's length union-employee
negotiations,"30 a fact that would determine the appropriateness of
exempting the restraints from antitrust attack.3
Although the court in Robertson refused to rule on the legality of
the NBA's player restraints,32 it suggested that the player draft and
perpetual reserve system violated the antitrust laws under either a
per se test or rule of reason standard.s In discussing the restraints'
possible defects under a per se standard, the court noted that they
were "readily susceptible to condemnation as group boycotts based
on the NBA's concerted refusal to deal, ' 34 following the Supreme
courts and antitrust plaintiffs of-the difficult analytical problems imposed by a rule of reason
inquiry, the Supreme Court has identified several practices in businesses other than profes-
sional sports that are sufficiently anticompetitive to be deemed illegal per se. See, e.g., United
States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969) (price-fixing); Northern Pac. R.R.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (tie-in contracts); International Salt Co. v. United States,
332 U.S. 392 (1947) (tie-in contracts); Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S.
457 (1941) (group boycotts); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940)
(price-fixing). For a more detailed discussion concerning the most appropriate standard of
review of alleged antitrust violations in professional sports, especially in situations involving
player discipline, see Weistart, Player Discipline in Professional Sports: The Antitrust Issues,
18 WM. & MARY L. REv. 703, 705-17 (1977).
27. For a discussion of the Rozelle Rule, see note 64 infra & accompanying text.
28. 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
29. Id. at 880, 896. The defendants also moved to dismiss the complaint both for failure to
join an indispensible party, the Players Association, and for lack of jurisdiction, contending
that primary jurisdiction belonged to the National Labor Relations Board. Id. at 878-79.
30. Id. at 895.
31. Id.
32. 389 F. Supp. at 895-96.
33. Id. at 895.
34. Id. at 893.
1978]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Court's rationales in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. 3
and Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC.3 1 Moreover,
they were "analogous to price fixing devices, '3 7 which the Supreme
Court had condemned in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,18
and they could "be viewed as devices creating illegal horizontal
territorial allocations and product market divisions"39 under the
Supreme Court's decision in Burke v. Ford.4" Furthermore, any per-
missible restraints would need to survive a judicltal examination
concerning their reasonableness, and the essential inquiry in such a
review would be whether less drastic protective measures were avail-
able. On this point Judge Carter noted:
it is difficult for me to conceive of any theory or set of circumstan-
ces pursuant to which the college draft, black-listing, boycotts
and refusals to deal could be saved from Sherman Act condemna-
tion .... The life of these restrictions, therefore, appears to be
all but over, although their formal interment must await further
developments in this case."
Professional hockey's reserve system became the subject of anti-
trust complaints in 1971, when the World Hockey Association's
(WHA) formation challenged the monopoly of the established Na-
tional Hockey League (NHL). The most significant case resulting
from this development was Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc.
v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc.,4" in which the WHA sought to
35. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
36. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
37. 389 F. Supp. at 893.
38. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
39. 389 F. Supp. at 893.
40. 389 U.S. 320 (1967).
41. 389 F. Supp. at 895. The court reserved ruling on the legality of the one-year player
reserve clause and the inter-team compensation plan, primarily because the NBA contended
that the plan differed fundamentally from football's Rozelle Rule. Id. at 896. For a discussion
of the Rozelle Rule, see note 64 infra & accompanying text. Although, on the merits, the plan
probably would have been found to be equivalent to the Rozelle Rule and therefore a restraint
of trade as a concerted refusal to deal, the issue never came to trial. An out of court settlement
agreement provided for the elimination of the compensation rule by 1980 and its replacement
by a right of first refusal, which would permit the player's current team to retain any free
agent by matching the highest offer he received from another club. A team failing to exercise
this right of first refusal would be entitled to compensation from the player's new team. See
L. SOBLE, supra note 3, at 118.
42. 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
[Vol. 19:395
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enjoin the NHL from enforcing its reserve clause." After the WHA
demonstrated that, because the NHL had controlled the labor mar-
ket through its reserve system for an undue period of time,"4 it had
deprived competing leagues of the opportunity to procure the serv-
ices of qualified professional major league hockey players, 5 Judge
Higginbotham ordered:
that the National Hockey League, . . . [is] preliminarily en-
joined from further prosecuting, commencing, or threatening to
commence any legal proceeding pursuant to and/or to enforce the
so-called "reserve clause" . . . of the National Hockey League
43. The reserve clause in the NHL's 1971-72 Standard Player's Contract provided:
Clause 17
"The Club agrees that it will on or before September 1st. . .next following the
season covered by this contract tender to the Player personally or by mail.
a contract upon the same terms as this contract save as to salary.
The Player hereby undertakes that he will at the request of the Club enter into
a contract for the following playing season upon the same terms and conditions
as this contract save as to salary which shall be determined by mutual agree-
ment.
In March, 1972, Clause 17 was amended to provide:
"17. The Club agrees that it will on or before September 1st (August 10th, in
the case of 'protected' players and those who played fifty NHL games in the
preceding season) next following the season covered by this contract tender to
the Player personally or by mail directed to the Player at his address set out
below his signature hereto a contract upon the same terms as this contract save
as to salary. The Player hereby undertakes that he will at the request of the Club
enter into a contract for the following playing season upon the same terms and
conditions as this contract save as to salary which shall be determined by mu-
tual agreement, failing which, by arbitration under the Arbitration Agreement
between the League and the NHL Players' Association dated March 29th,
1972."
Quoted in Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462, 474-75 (1972). See also NHL Standard Player's Contract 17 (1974 Form).
44. The court concluded that the reserve clause imposed a perpetual restraint on player
movement because Clause 17 of the NHL Standard Player's Contract provided that the club
could renew a player's contract on the same terms as the previous contract, except as to
salary. For the text of Clause 17 in both its original and amended versions, see note 43 supra.
The NHL argued that the reserve clause was not perpetual but was enforceable only until
1975, the expiration date of the current collective bargaining agreement. Although Judge
Higginbotham rejected the NHL's contention, he noted that the reserve clause, even if subject
to a three year limitation, nevertheless would be unreasonable. 351 F. Supp. at 517-18.
45. Hockey, unlike basketball and football, does not rely on a yearly supply of college
graduates for its player personnel; rather, the sport has a well-integrated system of minor
leagues. Through agreement with these minor leagues, the NHL not only controls its players
but also the minor league players. Id. at 478-80.
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Standard Player's Contract, against any player, coach or other
person whose contract, expired on or before November 8, 1970.6
The NHL reserve clause thus presumably violated section 2 of the
Sherman Act47 insofar as its operation prevented the WHA and its
member teams from effectively engaging in major league profes-
sional hockey. The court found a clear and substantial likelihood
that, in a trial on the merits, the existence of interlocking agree-
ments among NHL teams, the reserve clause, and agreements with
affiliated minor leagues and amateur hockey associations enabling
the NHL to control the availability of those organizations' athletes4"
would suffice to demonstrate the NHL's exercise of monopoly power
in violation of section 2. 41 The court refrained from deciding the
potential validity of the NHL's reserve system under section 1 of the
Sherman Act,1" however, because it recognized the uniqueness of
professional sports and the need for some type of system to maintain
league balance.5 ' This recognition implicitly suggested that the
court in Philadelphia World Hockey Club considered the rule of
reason the most appropriate standard for reviewing alleged antitrust
violations in the professional sports industry.
Another significant hockey case in which a district court con-
cluded that the NHL's reserve system violated federal antitrust law
46. Id. at 519.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). The court was uncertain whether the reserve clause violated § 1
of the Act. 351 F. Supp. at 518. For the pertinent text of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,
see note 12 supra.
48. See note 45 supra.
49. 351 F. Supp. at 518. The suit in Philadelphia World Hockey Club centered on a request
for a preliminary injunction. Prior to the trial on the merits the NHL, in December, 1973,
mooted the controversy by replacing its perpetual reserve clause with a one-year option clause
comparable to that then in use by the National Football League (NFL). See note 63 infra.
Pursuant to this new clause an athlete could play out his option by complying with his
contract for its duration and then either by sitting out the next year or by playing one more
year for his old team at a minimum stipulated price without signing a new contract. Upon
completion of that year, the athlete became a free agent and could sign with another team.
As did the NFL, the NHL adopted a compensation rule that requires a team signing a free
agent to compensate the player's former club. Unlike the NFL's previous compensation rule,
or Rozelle Rule, however, which provided the NFL Commissioner with the sole authority to
fix compensation in situations when the two teams could not reach a mutual agreement, see
note 64 infra, the present NHL compensation rule, which was first implemented in 1973,
provides that an arbitrator rather than the league president will resolve disputes between
clubs as to compensatory amounts. By-Laws of the National Hockey League § 9A.8.
50. See note 47 supra.
51. 351 F. Supp. at 503-12.
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was Boston Professional Hockey Association v. Cheevers.5 Gerry
Cheevers and Derek Sanderson, members of the NHL's Boston
Bruins, signed contracts to play with WHA teams after they pre-
viously had signed mandatory NHL Standard Player's Contracts
containing a reserve clause.5 3 Boston initiated a suit, seeking to
prevent the two athletes from playing in the WHA, but Cheevers
and Sanderson countered, claiming that the enforcement of their
NHL contracts would violate the antitrust laws. In determining
whether the NHL's use of standard player contracts actually re-
strained trade, the court held that, because the contracts must be
considered as a part of the total integrated.documents governing the
relationship between hockey players and member NHL clubs, they
were subject to the antitrust laws.54 The NHL had total control over
a hockey player from the time he first played in any organized
league through the end of his career, an obvious and serious anti-
trust violation; consequently, the court enjoined enforcement of the
contracts' reserve clauses. 5
Since the merger of the National Football League (NFL) and the
American Football League (AFL) the major resistance to profes-
sional football's player control system has arisen from the actions
of players seeking to enhance their bargaining positions. The first
of three landmark decisions concerning professional football's
player control restraints" was Kapp v. National Football League.5
Joe Kapp instituted a treble-damages antitrust action against the
NFL, its Commissioner, its individual teams, and other defendants.
He alleged that the provisions in the NFL's constitution and by-
laws for the player draft, the tampering rule, the option clause, and
the Rozelle Rule constituted a combination to refuse to deal, a per
se violation of the Sherman Act.
52. 348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass.), remanded, 472 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1972).
53. See note 43 supra. The NHL Standard Player's Contract also recited that because the
player possessed exceptional abilities as a hockey player, the loss of which could not be
compensated adequately, he agreed to permit his club to enjoin him from playing hockey for
any other team. See also NHL Standard Player's Contract 6 (1974 Form).
54. 348 F. Supp. at 265-66.
55. Id. at 267. For additional hockey cases arising from disputes between the WHA and
the NHL, see Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Nassau Sports v.
Hampson, 355 F. Supp. 733 (D. Minn. 1972).
56. The NFL's player restraint system provided the basis for the NHL's revised option
clause. See note 49 supra.
57. 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
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Judge Sweigert's factual presentation in Kapp succinctly de-
scribed the elaborate control mechanisms then encountered by a
football player. The Washington Redskins had selected Kapp, an
outstanding college quarterback, pursuant to the NFL's draft" and
had placed him on their reserve list, thus acquiring exclusive rights
to negotiate with him.59 Effectuating this exclusive right to negoti-
ate was the league's tampering rule, which provided severe penalties
for any club that intentionally negotiated with a player on another
team's reserve list."° A duty to bargain in good faith did not accom-
pany a team's acquisition of the exclusive right to negotiate with a
particular athlete, 1 however, and Washington never made Kapp an
acceptable offer. Kapp subsequently contracted to play in the Cana-
dian Football League (CFL), but Washington nevertheless retained
its exclusive NFL rights. Thereafter, the Houston Oilers of the
newly formed AFL negotiated with Kapp, and the two parties en-
tered into a contract, which the Commissioners of both the NFL and
the AFL declared invalid. Kapp eventually signed with the NFL's
58. The then relevant NFL draft rules and procedures, as set forth in the CONST. AND BY-
LAWS FOR THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE art. XIV (1976), provided that a seventeen round
player draft would be held once every year. Each club participating in a particular round
could select one athlete in that round, and the clubs made their selections in the reverse order
of their final standings from the previous year.
59. The NFL Constitution and By-Laws provide: "The selecting club shall have the exclu-
sive right to negotiate for the services of each player selected by it in the Selection Meeting.
Selected players shall be placed on the Reserve List of that club." Id. art. XIV, § 5.
60. The NFL's tampering rule provides:
If a member club or any officer, shareholder, director, partner, employee,
agent or representative thereof, or any person holding an interest in said club
shall tamper, negotiate with, or make an offer to a player on the Active, Reserve
or Selection List of another member club, then unless the offending club shall
clearly prove to the Commissioner that such action was unintentional, the of-
fending club, in addition to being subject to all other penalties provided in the
Constitution and By-Laws, shall lose its selection choice in the next succeeding
Selection Meeting in the same round in which the affected player was originally
selected in the Selection Meeting in which he was originally chosen. If such
affected player was never selected in any Selection Meeting, the Commissioner
shall determine the round in which the offending club shall lose its selection
choice. Additionally, if the Commissioner decided such offense was intentional,
the Commissioner shall have the power to fine the offending club and may
award the offended club 50% of the amount of the fine imposed by the Commis-
sioner. In all such cases the offended club must first certify to the Commissioner
that such an offense has been committed.
Id. art. IX, § 2.
61. See 390 F. Supp. at 76; note 59 supra.
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Minnesota Vikings, after that club had obtained his release from the
CFL and from Washington."
After completing a two-year contract with Minnesota, Kapp re-
fused to sign for the 1969 season, and the Vikings invoked his con-
tract's option clause"3 for that year. Kapp thus became a free agent
in 1970. Despite his demonstrated prowess, however, only three
teams expressed any interest in signing Kapp and only one made
him an offer. Kapp asserted that this disinterest was caused by the
NFL's Rozelle, or "Ransom," Rule, which required a club acquiring
a free agent to compensate his former team. 4 Kapp finally negoti-
ated a lucrative contract with the New England Patriots of the
NFL,65 but only after the Patriots and Vikings had arrived at a
mutually agreeable compensation package. Further complicating
matters, Kapp never complied with the requirement that he sign a
Standard Player's Contract with New England, and consequently,
he has been prevented from playing in the NFL since 1970.6
62. 390 F. Supp. at 76. To obtain Kapp's release from his contract option year in the CFL,
Minnesota paid $50,000 to the CFL franchise owning the rights to Kapp. Minnesota presuma-
bly also made satisfactory arrangements with Washington, the owner of the NFL rights to
Kapp. Id.
63. Previously, the NFL's option clause, as contained in the NFL Standard Players Con-
tract 10, provided:
The Club may, by sending notice in writing to the Player, on or before the
first day of May following the football season referred to in Section 1 hereof,
renew this contract for a further term of one (1) year on the same terms as are
provided by this contract, except that (1) the Club may fix the rate of compensa-
tion to be paid by the Club to the Player during said further term, which rate
of compensation shall not be less than ninety percent (90%) of the sum set forth
in Section 3 thereof and shall be payable in installments during the football
season in such further term as provided in Section 3; and (2) after such renewal
this contract shall not include a further option to the Club to renew the contract.
The phrase "rate of compensation" as above used shall not include bonus pay-
ments or payments of any nature whatsoever and shall be limited to the precise
sum set forth in Section 3 hereof.
64. CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAws FOR THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGou art. XII, § 1 (H) (1976).
If the two teams could not agree to a satisfactory compensation arrangement, the Rozelle Rule
provided the Commissioner with the absolute discretionary power to award the acquiring
club's players or future draft choices as compensation to the free agent's former team. Id.
65. This contract was not concluded until October 6, 1970, midway through the football
season. The terms provided for Kapp to play the remainder of the year and the 1971 and 1972
seasons for a total compensation of $600,000. 390 F. Supp. at 77.
66. All players must sign a Standard Players Contract. CONSTrruTiON AND BY-LAws FOR THE
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGuE art. XV, § 1 (1976). The importance of this requirement is that
the contract provides that a player "becomes bound by the Constitution, By-Laws, Rules and
Regulations of the league." 390 F. Supp. at 77.
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Based on these facts Judge Sweigert granted Kapp a partial sum-
mary judgment, concluding that the Rozelle Rule,"7 the draft rule,6"
the Standard Player's Contract, and the tampering rule 9 consti-
tuted patently unreasonable restraints of trade that violated the
antitrust laws under a rule of reason inquiry.78 The court found,
however, that the option rule was not patently unreasonable and
declined to determine its validity on a motion for summary judg-
ment.
71
67. 390 F. Supp. at 77. In discussing the Rozelle Rule, the court noted:
A conceivable effect of this rule would be to perpetually restrain a player from
pursuing his occupation among the clubs of a league that holds a virtual monop-
oly of professional football employment in the United States.
We conclude that such a rule imposing restraint virtually unlimited in time
and extent, goes far beyond any possible need for fair protection of the interests
of the club-employers or the purposes of the NFL and that it imposes upon the
player-employees such undue hardship as to be an unreasonable restraint and
such a rule is not susceptible of different inferences concerning its reasonable-
ness; it is unreasonable under any legal test ....
Id.
68. The court stated that "the draft rule . . . is also patently unreasonable insofar as it
permits virtually perpetual boycott of a draft prospect even when the drafting club refuses
or fails within a reasonable time to reach a contract with the player." Id.
69. The court deemed the tampering rule and the Standard Player Contract as patently
unreasonable in that they were devices to enforce the other rules. Id.
70. For a brief discussion of the difference between the rule of reason and the per se test,
see notes 24-26 supra & accompanying text. The court acknowledged that Kapp's factual
allegations constituted a group boycott, which consistently has been regarded as a per se
antitrust violation. 390 F. Supp. at 80, 87-88. See Note, National Football League Restrictions
on Competitive Bidding for Players' Services, 24 BUFF. L. Rav. 613 (1975); Note, Legality of
the Rozelle Rule and Related Practices in the National Football League, 4 FORDHAM URBAN
L.J. 581 (1976); Note, The True Story of What Happens When the Big Kids Say, "It's my
football, and you'll either play by my rules or you won't play at all", 55 NEB. L. REv. 335
(1976). The court nevertheless asserted that agreements between sports franchises within a
competitive league presented significantly different policy considerations from those found
in the typical antitrust controversy. According to the court, a sports league is a unique
business enterprise in that its success depends on balanced competition on the athletic field;
to achieve this balance, it must coordinate its efforts. Teams could not be allowed to conduct
an open bidding war for players, because the economically advantaged clubs would sign the
best players and would obtain a competitive superiority over the poorer teams. Such a situa-
tion would result in a loss of fan interest and support. In addition, the court found persuasive
the NFL's argument that historically the executive and the legislative branches of the federal
government had recognized the unique relationship between professional sports and the anti-
trust laws. 390 F. Supp. at 79-81 & nn. 4-5. Thus, the court concluded that "in this particular
field of sports league activities the purpose of antitrust laws can be just as well served (if not
better served) by the basic antitrust reasonableness test as by the absolute per se test some-
times applied by the courts in other fields." Id. at 82.
71. 390 F. Supp. at 82-83.
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Another landmark decision concerning professional football was
Mackey v. National Football League,7 2 which arose on a complaint
filed by present and former professional football players challenging
the validity of the Rozelle Rule. The district court held the rule to
be a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act,73 reasoning that
the rule and its related practices constituted "a concerted refusal to
deal and a group boycott on the part of defendants."74 The court also
found the Rozelle Rule invalid under a rule of reason inquiry be-
cause it was "unreasonably broad in its application," it failed to
provide the athletes with any procedural safeguards, and it was "a
perpetual restriction on a player, following him throughout his
career. ' ' 5
On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that
the rule of reason was the appropriate standard of review and that
the "Rozelle Rule, as enforced, unreasonably restrains trade in vio-
lation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act."7" In its rejection of the per
se test, the court reasoned that professional football was a unique
business, similar to a joint venture, in which each team had a vested
interest in the success of every other team; thus, "if the League
[failed], no one team [could] survive. 7 7 The court noted:
Although businessmen cannot wholly evade the antitrust law by
characterizing their operation as a joint venture, we conclude the
unique nature of the business of professional football renders it
inappropriate to mechanically apply per se illegality rules here,
fashioned in a different context. This is particularly true where,
as here, the alleged restraint does not completely eliminate com-
petition for players' services.78
72. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'g 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975).
73. 407 F. Supp. at 1007.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 543 F.2d at 622.
77. Id. at 619.
78. Id. (footnotes omitted). In support of its rationale the court cited several authorities
rejecting the appropriateness of a per se standard in unique business situations: White Motor
Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) (vertically imposed territorial restrictions); Worthen
Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard Inc., 485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 918 (1974) (combination of banks for joint operation of national credit card system);
Elman, "Petrified Opinions" and Competitive Realities,66 COLUM. L. Rav. 625 (1966). See
also Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (New York Stock Exchange rules
governing Exchange members).
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Having decided that the alleged antitrust violations should be
evaluated under a rule of reason standard, the Eighth Circuit then
determined whether the Rozelle Rule was an unreasonable restraint
on competition or whether it was justified by legitimate business
purposes. The court initially agreed with the district court that the
restraints on trade imposed by the Rozelle Rule were numerous and
serious: it "significantly deter[red] clubs from negotiating with the
signing free agents;"79 it significantly deterred players from playing
out their options to become free agents; it significantly hindered a
player's bargaining position; it deprived players of the right to place
their services for bids on the open market; it helped to maintain an
artificially low salary structure; and it deterred movement in inter-
state commerce. 8 The court next examined the NFL's arguments
for maintaining the Rozelle Rule, determining that those reasons
did not justify the restraints created by the rule's imposition. The
NFL asserted that without such a rule the teams offering attractive
intrinsic advantages such as larger salaries, good locations, and high
winning percentages would obtain the superior players and would
*create a harmful competitive imbalance within the league, that the
rule was necessary to protect a team's investment in its players, and
that without the rule the quality of competition within the league
would decline because players frequently would jump from team to
team and thereby destroy the teams' existing harmony and coordi-
nation.8 ' The court considered the last two reasons spurious and
obviously insufficient as justifications for the Rozelle Rule. It re-
garded a team's investment in players as an ordinary expense of
doing business and found that the NFL already had confronted and
managed problems of contract jumping.82 Thus, the key issue was
"whether the Rozelle Rule [was] essential to the maintenance of
competitive balance, and [was] no more restrictive than neces-
sary.""
In holding the Rozelle Rule unreasonable, the court indicated that
it would not decide whether any compensation system designed for
79. 543 F.2d at 620.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. For an in-depth discussion of the legal problems accompanying player contract
jumping, see Heiner, Post-Merger Blues: Intra-League Contract Jumping, 18 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 741 (1977).
83. 543 F.2d at 621.
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use in situations involving free agent transfers would be valid. The
Eighth Circuit held the particular rule invalid, however, because it
affected all players, not just the superstars for whom it apparently
was intended, it constituted a perpetual restriction on a player's
freedom of movement, and it contained no procedural safeguards.84
Another antitrust challenge involving professional football, Smith
v. Pro-Football,85 was a treble-damages antitrust action brought by
a former professional football player against the Washington Red-
skins and the NFL for injuries he suffered as a consequence of the
restrictive nature of the NFL player draft. Smith alleged that the
player draft constituted a concerted refusal to deal and a group
boycott, which restricted his ability to negotiate a contract fairly
reflecting his free market value and containing an adequate injury
protection guarantee.86
The court held that the draft was per se a violation of the antitrust
laws: "There is no question . . . that the restrictions composing the
draft 'are naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling
of competition.' 81 Moreover, the court held that, even if the rule of
reason test was the applicable standard of review, the player draft
nevertheless would violate the antitrust laws, because the draft's
selection procedure "is absolutely the most restrictive one imagina-
ble"8" and because the NFL had not demonstrated a correlation
between an early draft position and team improvement.8 1 Without
deciding whether less stringent player allocation methods could sat-
isfy even a rule of reason inquiry, the court nevertheless indicated
that the NFL either might replace its current seventeen round draft
with a two round draft or might allow more than one team to select
a player in the draft."0
84. Id. at 622.
85. 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976). See generally 41 ALB. L. Ray. 154 (1977).
86. An injury protection clause guarantees a player his salary for the length of his contract,
even if the player becomes incapacitated.
87. 420 F. Supp. at 745. For a brief explanation of the rules previously governing the NFL
player draft, see note 58 supra. In determining Smith's damages the court computed the
difference between the amount he might have received on the open market and the amount
he actually received from the Washington Redskins. The court concluded that Smith could
have obtained a three-year contract providing $54,000 per year and containing an injury
protection clause. The court ultimately granted the plaintiff a judgment for treble damages
in the amount of $276,600 plus costs and attorneys fees. 420 F. Supp. at 748-49.
88. 420 F. Supp. at 746.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 746-47.
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Antitrust confrontations also have involved traditionally non-
team sports such as tennis9' and golf.2 In Blalock v. Ladies Profes-
sional Golf Association93 official observers at the second round of the
1972 Ladies Professional Golf Association (LPGA) Tournament
charged that the plaintiff, Jane Blalock, an LPGA member, had
illegally moved her ball. The LPGA Executive Board voted to dis-
qualify Blalock from the tournament, to fine her $500, and to place
her on probation for the remainder of the 1972 playing season. The
Board subsequently voted to suspend the plaintiff from the LPGA
from June 1, 1972, until May 31, 1973. This one-year suspension,
Blalock argued, constituted a group boycott and was a per se viola-
tion of the antitrust laws.
In its decision in Blalock the court observed that professional golf
was subject to the antitrust laws. Moreover, the court stated that
the legality of conduct under the Sherman Act should be evaluated
under a rule of reason inquiry unless a "naked restraint of trade"
rendered the per se test applicable. 4 Blalock's suspension, the pur-
pose and effect of which was to exclude the plaintiff from the mar-
ket, represented such a "naked restraint of trade." Suspending the
plaintiff, concluded the court, was tantamount to excluding her
from the total market of professional golf because Blalock not only
would be barred from LPGA-sponsored tournaments but a provision
in the LPGA Constitution also would prevent her participation in
any non-LPGA-sponsored events without the LPGA executive
director's approval. 5 The court also found the suspension to be an
exercise of the LPGA's subjective discretion "as was evident from
the fact that they had initially imposed . . . only probation and a
fine, but then, without hearing from plaintiff, determined to impose
the suspension."9 The disciplinary action, observed the court, was
imposed by the plaintiff's competitors who stood to benefit materi-
ally from her suspension.
91. See, e.g., Drysdale v. Florida Team Tennis, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Pa. 1976);
Heldman v. United States Lawn Tennis Ass'n, 354 F. Supp. 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
92. See, e.g., Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 846 (1968); Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga.
1973).
93. 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
94. Id. at 1263-65.




Because the court held the LPGA's action to be illegal per se, it
declined to evaluate the suspension's reasonableness.9" The court
rejected, however, the LPGA's claim that the plaintiff's exclusion
from the market was a legitimate exercise of self-regulation entitled
to receive a rule of reason evaluation under the Supreme Court's
decision in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange.98 The LPGA's reli-
ance on Silver was held to be unjustified because, unlike Silver, in
which the policies of the Securities Exchange Act provided a justifi-
cation for the stock exchange to regulate its members, Blalock in-
volved no statute that might be construed in pari materia with the
antitrust laws.99
Two other cases are relevant in ascertaining the limits of permis-
sible self-regulation by sports leagues: Molinas v. National Basket-
ball Association"'0 and Deesen v. Professional Golfers'Association.0°
In Deesen the plaintiff, who was a Professional Golfers' Association
(PGA) tournament-approved player from 1952 to 1958, was pre-
vented by injuries in 1958 from competing in the required ten tour-
naments per year. As a result, the PGA's national tournament com-
mittee, composed primarily of non-competitors of Deesen, termi-
nated his status as an approved tournament player on the grounds
that his playing ability was insufficient and for failure to compete
in the required number of tournaments per year. 02 Deesen applied
for reinstatement, but his request was denied. In a subsequent anti-
trust action Deesen failed to prove that the PGA rules were applied
to him in a discriminatory manner or that any agreement, conspir-
97. Id. at 1265-66.
98. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
99. 359 F. Supp. at 1266. For a more extensive discussion of Blalock, see Weistart, supra
note 26, in which the author argues that unwarranted results would occur from a literal
application of the district court's conclusion that Silver permits self-regulation only when it
is supported by specific statutory authorization. Id. at 717-18 n.53. According to Professor
Weistart, the crucial factor in Blalock was the imposition of the suspension by Blalock's
competitors who might have gained from the plaintiff's removal from the sport. Id. at 718.
Moreover, the committee imposing the suspension possessed complete discretion in its deter-
mination of the most appropriate discipline, and Blalock consequently was denied the proce-
dural safeguards that must be exercised by private groups seeking to obtain evaluations of
their self-regulatory structures under the rule of reason inquiry. Id. at 718-19. See also text
accompanying notes 24-26 supra.
100. 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
101. 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966).
102. 358 F.2d at 168. This termination did not remove the plaintiff totally from the tourna-
ment market. Id. at 168-69.
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acy, or combination existed to prevent him from participating in
PGA tournaments or from earning a living as a professional golfer.
On the evidence presented, the trial court found no violation of
the Sherman Act, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's ruling.10 : Deesen's exclusion from tour-
nament competition, the court stated, was based on reasonable
grounds:
PGA is entitled to adopt reasonable measures for holding the
tournaments to a reasonable number. It was required to treat
Deesen as well as it treated others in the same category but it was
not compelled to give him special treatment simply because he
did not wish to accept PGA tournament entry rules and regula-
tions.'0
A district court reached a similar result in Molinas, in which the
plaintiff was suspended indefinitely by the NBA Commissioner for
gambling, a violation of both his contract and a league rule.' 5 Moli-
nas contended that the NBA's reserve clause was an illegal restric-
tion on competition, that his suspension constituted an illegal re-
fusal to deal, and that the league unlawfully prevented him from
playing in exhibition games with league players. The court, how-
ever, held that the NBA had not violated federal antitrust laws, '
because:
A rule. . . providing for the suspension of those who place wagers
on games in which they are participating seems not only reasona-
ble, but necessary for the survival of the league . . . . Surely,
every disciplinary rule which a league may invoke, although by
its nature it may involve some sort of a restraint, does not run
afoul of the anti-trust laws. And, a disciplinary rule invoked
against gambling seems about as reasonable a rule as could be
imagined.' 7
103. Id. at 171-72. In addition to hearing his request for reinstatement the PGA permitted
Deesen to play a number of "test" rounds of golf for review by the committee. Although
Deesen agreed, his average score was such that the court found the PGA warranted in denying
reinstatement. Id. at 168, 172.
104. Id. at 172 (footnote omitted).
105. 190 F. Supp. at 242.
106. Id. at 244.
107. Id. at 243-44. For a more detailed analysis of the court's holding in Molinas and the
impact of the case on a sports league's ability to regulate the conduct of its athletes, see
Weistart, supra note 26, at 724-27.
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The determinative factors in Molinas, Deesen, and Blalock were
the disciplinary and entry rules involved and the importance of
these rules to the professional sport in question. Reasonable efforts
at self-regulation that are applied with appropriate safeguards are
permissible. However, a group of competitors will not be permitted
to restrict market entry under the guise of self-regulation. In addi-
tion, no matter how pure their motive or commendable their end,
actions taken pursuant to a self-regulatory scheme that fails to pro-
vide procedural safeguards will be invalidated.
THE LABOR EXEMPTION
If a collective bargaining agreement such as that entered into
between the NFL and the National Football League Players Asso-
ciation (NFLPA) qualifies for the labor exemption to the antitrust
laws, the agreement is immune from attack thereunder, regardless
of its impact on competition. Congress specifically exempted certain
trade union activities from the purview of the Sherman Act, thus
removing the* labor movement's basic organizational weapons such
as the strike and the boycott from the scrutiny of the antitrust
laws.' In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized that a proper
accommodation must 'be made between the congressional policy
favoring collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations
Act and the legislative support for free competition as expressed in
the Sherman Act. °9 Reconciliation of these two national policies
necessitates that some collective bargaining agreements receive a
limited nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanctions., Such a
nonstatutory labor exemption is appropriate if the policy favoring
collective bargaining is so vital under the particular circumstances
as to outweigh the policy favoring free competition in business mar-
kets."'
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Flood v. Kuhn,"2 argued that
baseball should not be exempt from the antitrust laws."3 Neverthe-
108. See notes 121-23, 130-34, 194-97 infra & accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
110. Id. at 622 (citing Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S.
.676 (1965)).
111. 421 U.S. at 622.
112. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
113. Id. at 288 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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less, he cautioned that antitrust suits would be inappropriate to
challenge every facet of baseball, specifically referring to the labor
exemption as a potential obstacle to the application of the antitrust
laws." ' Justice Marshall's recognition that labor law might have
important consequences in determining the applicability of anti-
trust legislation to professional sports enterprises has been a recur-
ring theme in recent antitrust cases against sports teams." 5 Thus, a
proper analysis of whether professional sports collective bargaining
agreements qualify for the labor exemption requires an examination
of the exemption both as it has been interpreted and applied by the
Supreme Court in non-sports industries and as it has been applied
in professional sports cases after Flood.
The Labor Exemption in Non-Professional Sports Cases
Although it is uncertain whether Congress initially intended that
the Sherman Act be applied to labor union activity,"6 employers at
the turn of the century succeeded in using the antitrust laws to
attack the struggling trade union movement."7 In Loewe v.
Lawlor,"8 the notorious Danbury Hatters case, an employer insti-
tuted a treble-damages action against the officers and members of
the hatters' union, alleging that the union's initiation of a nation-
wide secondary boycott against the firm constituted an illegal re-
straint of trade. In a literal interpretation of the antitrust laws, the
Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Fuller, held that unions were
114. Id. at 293. Justice Marshall suggested that Flood be remanded for a thorough investi-
gation of the applicability of the labor exemption. Id. at 296.
115. See, e.g., Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Kansas
City Royals v. Major League Baseball Players' Ass'n, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976); Smith v.
Pro-Football 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F.
Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal.
1974); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp.
462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
116. For a complete discussion of the congressional intent underlying the Sherman Act, see
E. BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN Acr 11-54 (1930). See also F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE,
THE LABOR INJUNCnON 5-17 (1930); Siegal, Connolly, & Walker, The Antitrust Exemption for
Labor-Magna Carta or Carte Blanche?, 13 DuQ. L. REv. 411, 415-20 (1975); Winter, Collective
Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73
YALE L.J. 14, 30-32 (1963).
117. Between 1890 and 1897, the first seven years of the Sherman Act's existence, federal
courts found unions in violation of the Act 12 times but held only one business combination
liable under the statute. See cases cited in E. BERMAN, supra note 116, at 3.
118. 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
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susceptible to antitrust actions under the Sherman Act because
"[t]he act made no distinction between classes. It provided that
'every' contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade was
illegal." ''1 With their viability threatened by this application of the
Sherman Act,"' the trade unions, whose avowed purpose was to
eliminate competition from the labor market, understandably lob-
bied intensively for passage of the Clayton Act, 2' which was de-
signed in part to immunize unions from the sweep of the antitrust
laws. Two provisions of the Act were designed to legitimate the labor
movement: section 6 declared that "It]he labor of a human being
is not a commodity or article of commerce," and that consequently
the antitrust laws should not be construed to forbid labor organiza-
tions "from carrying out the legitimate objects thereof;"' 22 and sec-
tion 20 limited management's ability to obtain federal injunctions
in labor disputes2
119. Id. at 301.
120. The union's membership ultimately was held responsible for treble damages exceed-
ing $200,000, Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522 (1915), and the case's litigation expenses raised
the total cost to over $400,000. Although the American Federation of Labor paid most of the
judgment, each member of the hatters' union lost his entire life savings. See J. COMMONS &
J. ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGiSLATION 412 (4th ed. 1936); P. TAFr, ORGANIZED LABOR
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 216-18 (1964).
121. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1970)
and 20 U.S.C. §§ 52, 53 (1970)).
122. Section 6 provides:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and
operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the
purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit,
or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully
carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the
members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies
in restraint of trade, under antitrust laws.
15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970).
123. Section 20 provides:
No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United
States, or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case between an employer and
employees, or between employers and employees, or between employees, or
between persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or grow-
ing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, unless
necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a property right, of the
party making the application, for which injury there is no adequate remedy at
law, and such property or property right must be described with particularity
in the application, which must be in writing and sworn to by the applicant or
by his agent or attorney.
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Despite the broad language and clear intent of the Clayton Act
to exempt labor from antitrust attack the Supreme Court narrowly
defined the "legitimate" objectives of trade unions, authorizing an-
titrust suits against unions who pursued "unlawful" goals or em-
ployed "unlawful" means. Thus, in Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering'24 a secondary boycott implemented by a machinists' union
attempting to organize the employees of a printing press manufac-
turer was held illegal under the Sherman Act.'25 The Court limited
the Clayton Act's immunity to the activities of Duplex's immediate
employees because they were the only persons proximately con-
cerned with the labor dispute and because "Congress had in mind
particular industrial controversies not a general class war."' 28 In
another nationwide secondary boycott case, Bedford Cut Stone Co.
v. Journeyman Stone Cutters' Association, 2 the Court emphasized
that "[a] restraint of interstate commerce cannot be justified by
the fact that the ultimate object of the participants was to secure
an ulterior benefit which they might have been at liberty to pursue
by means not involving such restraint."'2 s As a consequence of these
and numerous other decisions throughout the 1920's holding unions
And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or per-
sons, whether singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of employment,
or from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from recommending, advising,
or persuading others by peaceful means so to do; or from attending at any place
where any such persons or persons may lawfully be, for the purpose of peacefully
obtaining or communicating information, or from peacefully persuading any
person to work or to abstain from working; or from ceasing to patronize or to
employ any party to such dispute, or from recommending, advising, or persuad-
ing others by peaceful and lawful means so to do; or from paying or giving to,
or withholding from, any person engaged in such dispute, any strike benefits or
other moneys or things of value; or from peaceably assembling in a lawful
manner, and for lawful purposes; or from doing any act or thing which lawfully
be done in the absence of such dispute by any party thereto; nor shall any of
these acts specified in this paragraph be considered or held to be violations of
any law of the United States.
29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970).
124. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
125. Id. at 478.
126. Id. at 472. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brandeis, who was joined by Justices
Holmes and Clarke, argued that the Clayton Act declared "the right of industrial combatants
to push their struggle to the limits of the justification of self-interest," id. at 488, and reflected
Congress' decision that federal judges' determinations of "what public policy in regard to
the industrial struggle demands" is inappropriate. Id. at 485.
127. 274 U.S. 37 (1927).
128. Id. at 47.
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liable for antitrust violations, 9 organized labor again sought relief
through the political process.
Determined to overrule legislatively the Supreme Court's narrow
interpretation of the Clayton Act,'30 Congress in 1932 passed the
Norris-LaGuardia Act,'3 ' thus directing courts to construe broadly
the term "labor dispute," which was defined to include "any contro-
versy concerning terms or conditions of employment. . . regardless
of whether or not the disputants stand in the proxiiaate relations of
employer and employee.' ' 32 Moreover, in precluding federal courts
from issuing injunctions in most labor disputes,1'3 the Act was in-
129. See cases cited in Siegal, Connolly, & Walker, supra note 116, at 430-34.
130. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report stated: "The purpose of the bill is to pro-
tect the rights of labor in the same manner the Congress intended when it enacted the
Clayton Act, . . .which act, by reason of its construction and application by the Federal
courts, is ineffectual to accomplish the congressional intent." S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1932).
131. Act of Mar. 23, 1932, ch. 90, §§ 1-15, 47 Stat. 70 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115
(1970)).
132. 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1970).
133. Sections 4 and 5 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provide in pertinent part:
4. No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restrain-
ing order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing
out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or
interested in such dispute . ., from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of
the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment;
(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of any
employer organization, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as is
described in section 3 of this title;
(c) Paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person participating or inter-
ested in such labor dispute, any strike or unemployment benefits or insurance,
or other moneys or things of value;
(d) By all lawful means aiding any person participating or interested in any
labor dispute who is being proceeded against in, or is prosecuting, any action or
suit in any court of the United States or of any State;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor
dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method
not involving fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their
interests in a labor dispute;
5. No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue a restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction upon the ground that any of the
persons participating or interested in a labor dispute constitute or are engaged
in an unlawful combination or conspiracy because of the doing in concert of the
acts enumerated in Section 4 of this title.
Id. §§ 104-105 (1970).
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tended "to withdraw federal courts from a type of controversy for
which many believed they were ill-suited and from participation in
which, it was feared, judicial prestige might suffer." '134 In 1935 Con-
gress further expressed the strong policy in favor of collective bar-
gaining and judicial restraint in labor controversies by enacting the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).15
After these latter legislative efforts the Supreme Court acquiesced
in the congressional mandate to shield most union activities from
the purview of the Sherman Act.'36 The first case to recognize the
autonomy of labor union activitiy was United States v.
Hutcheson,'37 which arose out of an antitrust suit involving a work-
jurisdiction dispute between rival unions. Although the employer
had entered into agreements providing the members of one of the
unions with the disputed work, the disappointed aspirant refused to
arbitrate, picketed the employer, and urged its members and their
friends to refrain from buying the employer's products.' 3 The Court
affirmed the lower court's holding that no antitrust violation arose
from these facts. 3 1 Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion indicated
that the Sherman, Clayton, and Norris-LaGuardia Acts must be
considered jointly to determine the scope of the labor exemption.
Justice Frankfurter acknowledged that Congress intended a liberal
reading of these statutes to exclude most union activities from the
purview of the Sherman Act.40 Interpreting the directives of Con-
gress, the Court established a standard for applying the antitrust
laws to union activities:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine
with non-labor groups, the licit and illicit under § 20 [of the
Clayton Act] are not to be distinguished by any judgment re-
garding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the
134. See F. FRANKaviRT & N. GREENE, supra note 116, at 200.
135. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970)). See
Keyserling, The Wagner Act: Its Origin and Current Significance, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 199
(1960).
136. The Court recognized that "[t]he underlying aim of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was
to restore the broad purpose which Congress thought it had formulated in the Clayton Act
but which was frustrated, so Congress believed, by unduly restrictive judicial construction."
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 235-36 (1941).
137. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
138. Id. at 228.
139. Id. at 232-33.
140. Id. at 231.
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selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particular
union activities are the means."'
Although recognizing a broad statutory exemption for labor un-
ions, the Court in Hutcheson made clear that the scope of the im-
munity was not absolute. For example, the exemption only protects
bona fide union activities; it does not shelter those controversies in
which the union acts as a proprietor or in which the employer-
employee relationship has no bearing.4 2 Another prerequisite to a
labor group's qualification for the exemption enunciated in
Hutcheson is that the union must act in its own self-interest.4 3
Thus, if a collective bargaining agreement is merely a sham de-
signed to afford an employer antitrust immunity, the labor exemp-
tion would be inapplicable. Finally, the statutory labor exemption
would be available only if the union does not combine with nonlabor
groups to achieve its aims. The last of these three limitations, the
nonconspiracy proviso, is the most significant.
The leading, conspiracy case is Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3,
IBEW, 44 in which the union was charged with conspiring with man-
ufacturers of electrical equipment and with electrical contractors to
secure a price-fixing arrangement in the New York City area. The
union allegedly participated in the scheme by mounting an aggres-
sive campaign to obtain closed-shop agreements with all the local
contractors and the electrical equipment manufacturers. Under
these contracts, the contractors were obligated to purchase their
equipment only from local manufacturers who also had closed-shop
agreements with Local 3, and the manufacturers agreed to confine
their local sales to those contractors employing the Local's mem-
141. 312 U.S. at 232 (footnote omitted)(emphasis supplied).
142. P. AREEDA, ANrrrRusT ANALYisS 104 (2d ed. 1974). See Local 189, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 733 (1965)(Goldberg, J., concurring). Thus, in Colum-
bia River Co. v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942), the Court denied the exemption to the Pacific
Coast Fishermen's Union because the union attempted to set the price of fish to be sold to
processors. Id. at 145-47.
143. In United States v. Women's Sportswear Ass'n, 336 U.S. 461 (1949), the contested
provisions of a contract were incorporated into the agreement only after the employers'
association became fearful that its actions in the industry were violating the antitrust laws.
The new contract gave nothing new to the employees, and the trial court found no evidence
that the union participated in formulating the contract's contested provisions. Because the
union lacked the self-interest necessary to legitimize this arrangement, the labor exemption
was unavailable to both the union and the employer. Id. at 464.
144. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
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bers. Undoubtedly, the self-interest requirement was satisfied in
Allen Bradley inasmuch as the union's motivation was a desire to
increase membership and to improve wages and working condi-
tions.' Nevertheless, reasoning that "if business groups, by com-
bining with labor unions can fix prices and divide up markets, it was
little more than a futile gesture for Congress to prohibit price fixing
by business groups themselves,"' 46 the Court held that the employer
could not invoke the union's aid in an attempt to establish a shel-
tered market.'47 Although the Sherman Act did not negate totally
the congressional policies favoring collective bargaining, the Court
refused to infer a congressional purpose "to immunize labor unions
who aid and abet manufacturers and traders in violating the Sher-
man Act."'4 8 Thus, Allen Bradley held that the same labor union
activities may or may not violate the antitrust laws, depending on
whether the union acts alone or in combination with business
groups 149
Until 1965 Hutcheson represented the general rule regarding the
statutory labor exemption, and Allen Bradley outlined the principal
limitation to that rule. Congress resisted proposals to eliminate or
circumscribe the exemption when it enacted the Taft-Hartley Act
in 1947.150 In 1965, however, two companion cases, UMW v.
Pennington'5' and Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel
Tea Co., 52 afforded the Supreme Court an opportunity to review the
scope of the labor exemption. The resulting decisions sparked a
storm of confusion, criticism, and controversy.'5 3
In Pennington the United Mine Workers Union and several large
145. Id. at 799.
146. Id. at 810.
147. Id. at 809.
148. Id. at 810.
149. Id.
150. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 639-46 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). See also Cohen, Labor and the Antitrust Laws: A New Look at a Recurring Issue,
in LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1976, PROCEEDINGS OF TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
LABOR LAW 157, 161 (1976).
151. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
152. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
153. See, e.g., Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws: Pennington and Jewel Tea, 46 B.U.L.
REV. 317 (1966); DiCola, Labor Antitrust: Pennington, Jewel Tea and Subsequent
Meandering, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 705 (1972); Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining,
and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CH. L. REv. 659 (1965); Comment, Labor's Antitrust Exemp-
tion After Pennington and Jewel Tea, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 742 (1966).
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coal producers had agreed on substantial wage increases to be im-
posed industry-wide. The plaintiff, a small independent coal produ-
cer, alleged that this agreement constituted a conspiracy to destroy
the smaller, less efficient coal operators who could not afford to pay
the uniform wage scale. In an opinion by Justice White, the Court
held that if the allegations were true the labor exemption would be
inapplicable. 154 Under Allen Bradley, "one group of employers may
not conspire to eliminate competitors from the irfdustry and the
union is liable with the employers if it becomes a party to the con-
spiracy."'5 5 The Court extended the scope of Allen Bradley, how-
ever, to disqualify from the labor exemption any union that had
"agreed with one set of employers to impose a certain wage scale on
other bargaining units."'5 6
Thus, Pennington warned that a union acts at its own peril if, as
part of a collective bargaining agreement, it restricts its discretion
in future negotiations outside the bargaining unit. Nevertheless, a
union legitimately may pursue a policy of bargaining for uniform
industry-wide wage rates, provided that the union's strategy does
not reveal any collusion and conspiracy with an employer. In its
description of permissible union conduct within the labor exemp-
tion, the Court stated that "a union may conclude a wage agreement
with the multi-employer bargaining unit without violating the anti-
trust laws and that it may as a matter of its own policy, and not by
agreement with all or part of the employers of that unit, seek the
same wages from other employers."' 57
154. 381 U.S. at 663.
155. Id. at 665-66.
156. Id. at 665.
157. Id. at 664. Justice White emphasized that, although wages are a mandatory subject
of collective bargaining, see NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 94-96 (1957),
limits existed as "to what a union or an employer may offer or extract in the name of wages,
and because they must bargain does not mean that the agreement reached may disregard
other laws." 381 U.S. at 665.
Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, agreed that if, for the purpose of forcing some
employers out of business, an industry-wide collective bargaining agreement established a
wage scale exceeding the financial capabilities of some operators, then both the union and
the conspiring employers would be guilty of antitrust violations. Id. at 672-73 (Douglas, J.,
concurring). In addition, Douglas argued that "an industry-wide agreement containing those
features is prima facie evidence of a violation," id. at 673, and noted:
It is elementary that an unlawful conspiracy may be and often is formed without
simultaneous action or agreement on the part of the conspirators. Acceptance
by competitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation to participate in
1978]
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In Jewel Tea an employer brought an antitrust action against
several unions, alleging that a restricted marketing hours provision
in a collective bargaining contract constituted an illegal restraint of
trade.' Justice White, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Warren
and Justice Brennan,' 9 observed that the findings of the district
court presented a case "stripped of any claim of a union-employer
conspiracy.""'6 Nevertheless, Justice White refused to adhere rigidly
to the implication in Allen Bradley that an arrangement secured by
a union acting unilaterally and without any purpose of aiding and
abetting an employer's anticompetitive practices would receive an-
titrust immunity automatically:' "The fact that the parties to the
agreement are but a single employer and the unions representing its
employees does not compel immunity for the agreement."'62 Rather,
a determination of the labor exemption's availability, according to
Justice White, required the Court to accommodate the Sherman
Act's coverage with the policies of the national labor laws'63 and,
consequently, to decide:
a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint of inter-
state commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the
Sherman Act.
Id. at 673 note (quoting Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939) (citations
omitted)).
158. 381 U.S. at 680-81. The controversy in Jewel Tea arose during the negotiation of a new
contract when the unions rejected proposals by a multi-employer group for the elimination
of existing contract restrictions on marketing hours that forbade the sale of fresh meat before
9 a.m. and after 6 p.m. in both service and self-service markets. The unions ultimately
prevailed in retaining the provision in a contract accepted by the Jewel Tea Company only
under the threat of a strike. After signing the agreement, Jewel Tea brought an action against
the unions, alleging that the marketing hours restriction was an illegal restraint of trade.
159. The Court issued no opinion. In addition to Justice White's opinion, Justice Goldberg
wrote a separate concurring opinion in which Justices Harlan and Stewart joined. Justice
Douglas, joined by Justices Black and Clark, dissented. Six Justices agreed that the unions'
activities qualified for an exemption from the antitrust laws but disagreed on the rationale
for that result.
160. Id. at 688. But see id. at 737 (Douglas, J., dissenting): "In saying that there was no
conspiracy, the District Court failed to give any weight to the collective bargaining agreement
itself as evidence of a conspiracy. . . .This Court makes the same mistake." Justice Douglas
would have found a conspiracy and denied the labor exemption. Id.
161. Id. See text accompanying notes 148-49 supra.
162. 381 U.S. at 689. Justice White considered the issue of whether the collective bargain-
ing agreement qualified for the labor exemption, although, on the merits, the absence of a
conspiracy might have barred a finding that the restricted hours provision constituted a
violation of the antitrust laws. Id. at 688-89.
163. Id. at 689. Justice Powell later characterized as the "nonstatutory" exemption this
need to balance the national labor policy promoting collective bargaining with the coverage
of the Sherman Act. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975).
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whether the marketing-hours restriction, like wages, and unlike
prices, is so intimately related to wages, hours and working condi-
tions that the unions' successful attempt to obtain that provision
through bona fide, arm's-length bargaining in pursuit of their
own labor union policies, and not at the behest of or in combina-
tion with nonlabor groups, falls within the protection of the na-
tional labor policy and is therefore exempt from the Sherman
Act.164
Justice White considered the "crucial determinant" in this regard
to be the "relative impact [of the agreement] on the product mar-
ket and the interests of union members."'' 5 Although the restricted
marketing hours provision's effect on competition was "apparent
and real," it also was an "immediate and direct" concern of the
union members.' In weighing these respective interests, Justice
White concluded that the "national labor policy expressed in the
National Labor Relations Act places beyond the reach of the Sher-
man Act union-employer agreements on when, as well as how long,
employees must work."'6 7 Thus, if the union's interests are inti-
mately related to the collective bargaining process, then its unilat-
eral conduct would be exempt from antitrust liability, especially
when the resulting collective bargaining agreement, although affect-
ing the employer's ability to compete, does not create a naked re-
straint of trade.
In an opinion applicable to both cases, Justice Goldberg, who was
joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, concurred in the results of
Jewel Tea and Pennington but dissented from the Court's opinion
in Pennington. 6 He believed that Justice White's opinions in both
Pennington and Jewel Tea represented a "refusal by judges to give
full effect to congressional action designed to prohibit judicial inter-
vention via the antitrust route in collective bargaining."'6 9 Rejecting
Justice White's balancing approach in Jewel Tea, Justice Goldberg
argued that any collective bargaining activity concerning manda-
tory subjects of bargaining should qualify for the labor exemption. 170
164. 381 U.S..at 689-90.
165. Id. at 690 n.5.
166. Id. at 691.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 697 (Goldberg, J., concurring & dissenting).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 710. In contrast to Justice Goldberg's absolutist approach, Justice White as-
serted: "Employers and unions are required to bargain about wages, hours and working
1978l
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Thus, he concluded that to require unions and employers to bargain
seriously over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment and to allow unions to strike over such issues if no satis-
factory agreement was forthcoming, but to subject both parties to
possible antitrust penalties if they reached an agreement, was illogi-
cal and absurd. 7'
Although Pennington and Jewel Tea clearly demonstrated that
the parameters of the labor exemption had shifted, the scope of the
new dimensions remained uncertain. In appropriate circumstances
lower courts apparently were directed to weigh the broad congres-
sional policy in favor of collective bargaining against the equally
strong policy in favor of free competition. Unfortunately, the courts
were not provided with criteria for determining whether the inter-
ests of the union members were "immediate and direct" or whether
the effect of market restrictions was more than "apparent and real."
Without clearer guidance, one commentator noted, the conflict be-
tween the Sherman Act and the legislation favoring collective bar-
gaining is "so irreconciliable that, apart from subordinating one to
the other, the regulatory distinctions must be largely arbitrary.
There are no general principles by which these policies can be har-
monized." 7 '
Thus, in some situations, efforts to reconcile these two sometimes
incompatible policies are futile. Either the antitrust laws are appli-
cable in all their force or they are inapplicable; semi-violation of the
Sherman Act is impossible. Antitrust treble-damages suits stand in
stark contrast to the NLRA's remedial philosophy, which seeks to
equalize rather than to penalize. The national labor policy deters
one party to a collective bargaining agreement from annihilating the
other, thereby facilitating the collective bargaining process between
employers and unions.
Several commentators have objected to any renewed involvement
of the courts in the surveillance of union activity and collective
bargaining agreements. 73 The expressed fear is that the courts will
conditions, and this fact weighs heavily in favor of antitrust exemption for agreements on
these subjects." Id. at 689. Both Justices agreed that the restricted marketing hours provision
concerned a mandatory subject of bargaining. Id. at 691; Id. at 727 (Goldberg, J., concurring
& dissenting).
171. Id. at 711-12 (Goldberg, J., concurring & dissenting).
172. See Winter, supra note 116, at 16-17.
173. See, e.g., DiCola, supra note 153, at 747, who states: "Neither White nor Brennan
asked what is submitted to be the real question-whether the courts should be in the business
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have "neither the aptitude nor the criteria for reaching sound deci-
sions,"'' 74 and critics doubt whether the courts are capable of effec-
tively and objectively balancing labor interests against market re-
straints. Notwithstanding the question of competence, judicial scru-
tiny of the effect of union activities on the competitive product
market clearly creates a tension with the non-activist, non-
interventionist, neutral role espoused by the Supreme Court in
Hutcheson. 75
The confusion engendered by Pennington and Jewel Tea was ac-
centuated by the disparate views adopted by the Justices in the two
cases. American Federation of Musicians v. Carroll' afforded the
Court an opportunity to harmonize these differing opinions, but the
case's resolution ultimately failed to dispel the fears of critics who
insisted that no workable formula had been devised.'7 In Carroll
four orchestra leaders alleged that the musicians' union bylaws con-
cerning "club-date" engagements constituted antitrust violations in
that their purpose and effect was to require the setting of minimum
prices to be charged by orchestra leaders. 178 The Court avoided an
endorsement of either Justice White's "intimately related" test or
the "mandatory subject of collective bargaining" rationale of Jus-
tice Goldberg. 79 Instead, it held that the orchestra leaders were both
a labor group and a party to a labor dispute, thus bringing the
union's practices firmly within the statutory labor exemption as
construed in Hutcheson.8 0 The Court concluded that the union
acted in its own self-interest 8 ' and that the price floors were a prop-
er union method "for coping with the job and wage competition of
of balancing labor interests against market restraints. . . .This, after all, is what §§ 6 and
20 of the Clayton Act, the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the NLRA are all about."
174. Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L. Rav. 252,
269 (1955).
175. 312 U.S. at 231-32; see text accompanying notes 140-41 supra.
176. 391 U.S. 99 (1968).
177. See DiCola, supra note 153, at 753, who states:
Jewel Tea-type cases of 1965-72 vintage indicate little adherence to Justice
White's "intimately related" test in the lower courts. Justice Goldberg's view
in Jewel Tea seems to have gained acceptance, if only by default. Only in Carroll
did the court of appeals appear to have balanced labor interest with product
market restraint and, in that case, the Supreme Court reversed.
178. 391 U.S. at 104.
179. Id. at 110-11.
180. Id. at 106.
181. Id. at 107.
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the leaders to protect the wage scales of musicians. '18
The 1975 decision in Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local
100J is the most recent and perhaps the most important Supreme
Court case to examine the labor exemption. Connell resulted from
a building trade union's efforts to organize employees of the me-
chanical subcontractors in the Dallas area. A primary tactic in the
union's campaign was the picketing of general contractors to compel
them to agree to deal only with subcontractors who were parties to
the union's current collective bargaining agreement. ' The union
had no intention to represent the employees of the general contrac-
tor that it picketed. 85 Connell, one of the general contractors, reluc-
tantly capitulated to the union's pressure and signed the subcon-
tracting agreement under protest. Shortly thereafter, Connell, al-
though alleging no union conspiracy,' 8 instituted a suit to enjoin
enforcement of the subcontracting agreement, asserting that it was
an illegal restraint of competition under federal and state law.', '
The Supreme Court agreed with the union that the risk of conflict
with federal labor law preempted state antitrust laws' 8 but held
that the union's actions did not qualify for the labor exemption.' 9
Justice Powell, writing for the Court, 9 ' attempted to clarify Justice
White's opinions in Pennington and Jewel Tea pertaining to the
labor exemption and, in the process, broadly extended the implica-
tions of those decisions. Although emphasizing that the broad statu-
182. Id. at 109. Justice White dissented on the ground that the use of a price list in
situations in which leaders did not actually perform should not qualify for the labor exemp-
tion. Id. at 117. He argued that a proper weighing of the competing policy considerations
would result in a finding that the union's interest in preventing downward pressure on wages
was an insufficient justification for allowing the union to engage in price-fixing. Id. at 119.
Justice White hoped that the majority's rationale would be limited to the special employment
circumstances and problems of the music industry. Id.
183. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
184. Id. at 618-19.
185. Id. at 619.
186. Id. at 625 n.2.
187. Id. at 620-21.
188. Id. at 635.
189. Id. at 626. Furthermore, the Court rejected Local 100's contention that the subcon-
tracting agreement it obtained from Connell was permissible under the construction industry
proviso of § 8(e) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970), 421 U.S. at 626, and held that, at
least for § 8(e) violations, the employer's remedies included those provided by the antitrust
laws and the NLRA. Id. at 634-35.
190. Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, and
Rehnquist. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, dissented.
Justice Douglas also wrote a separate dissent.
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tory exemption examined in Hutcheson did not extend to
"concerted action or agreements between unions and nonlabor par-
ties,""' the Court explicitly recognized that its prior decisions had
extended a nonstatutory labor exemption for certain labor-
management combinations or agreements.'92 Accordingly, the Court
determined that:
A proper accommodation between the congressional policy favor-
ing collective bargaining under the NLRA and the congressional
policy favoring free competition in business markets requires that
some union-employer agreements be accorded a limited non-
statutory exemption from antitrust sanctions."13
The scope of the statutory exemption is much greater than the
limited nonstatutory exemption created by the courts. The statu-
tory exemption is designed to shelter the basic organizational weap-
ons of unions-the strike, picketing, and boycotts-from antitrust
attack. The availability of this exemption is not dependent upon a
balancing of antitrust and labor law policies; ' 4 rather, it is an abso-
lute congressional grant of protection for these enumerated union
activities."15 Provided the alleged restraint flows from an activity
countenanced by the Clayton Act or the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the
union is not subject to antitrust sanctions.' '
The paradox of the statutory labor exemption is that Congress
legitimized the means of organizing, but it did not explicitly exempt
from the purview of the Sherman Act the product of successful
union activity, the collective bargaining agreement. Whatever pro-
tection the judiciary affords collective bargaining agreements must
be extrapolated from the congressional policy in favor of collective
bargaining. Congress' general preference for collective bargaining,
however, coexists with the strong policy expressed in the antitrust
statutes of maintaining and protecting a competitive marketplace.
Thus, although the statutory exemption permits unions to establish
unilaterally some market restraints, the courts will scrutinize care-
fully similar restraints adopted through union-employer agreements
191. 421 U.S. at 622 (emphasis supplied).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 621-22. See also American Federation of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99
(1968).
195. 421 U.S. at 621-22.
196. Id. at 622-23.
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to determine whether the latter schemes qualify for the nonstatu-
tory labor exemption."7
In Connell Local 100's goal was to achieve higher wages and better
working conditions for its members through the organization of as
many subcontractors as possible. 18 Instead of employing means that
were statutorily exempt from antitrust attack, however, the union
entered into an agreement with Connell, a nonlabor party. The
Court, consequently, analyzed the eligibility of this agreement for
the nonstatutory labor exemption by determining whether its anti-
competitive effects were justified by the national labor policy. The
Court concluded that the union's subcontracting agreement with
Connell was a direct restraint on competition inasmuch as it indis-
criminately excluded some subcontractors from the market simply
because they were nonunion. 99 Although the union was pursuing
legitimate goals, its methods failed to qualify for the labor exemp-
tion because "[labor policy clearly does not require . . . that a
union have freedom to impose direct restraints on competition
among those who employ its members."' 0 The agreement created
market restraints that contravened the fundamental policies of the
Sherman Act, but its furtherance of the national labor policies was
negligible, because Local 100 claimed no interest in organizing the
employees of the contractor that it picketed. 01 The Court did not
determine whether a more immediate and direct union interest
could have led to the validation of Local 100's coercive action
against Connell: "There can be no argument in this case, whatever
its force in other contexts, that a restraint of this magnitude might
be entitled to an antitrust exemption if it were included in a lawful
collective-bargaining agreement." ' 2
197. Id. at 623, 625.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 623. The Court stated:
This kind of direct restraint on the business market has substantial anticompe-
titive effects, both actual and potential, that would not follow naturally from
the elimination of competition over wages and working conditions. It contrav-
enes antitrust policies to a degree not justified by congressional labor policy, and
therefore cannot claim a nonstatutory exemption from the antitrust laws.
Id. at 625.
200. Id. at 622.
201. Id. at 625-26.
202. Id. In his dissent, Justice Stewart reviewed the legislative history of both the Taft-
Hartley Act of 1947 and the Landrum-Griffin Amendments of 1959, concluding that Congress
did not intend agreements such as that between Local 100 and Connell to be the subject of
antitrust complaints. Id. at 639, 654. Justice Stewart argued that, if the agreement violated
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In contrast to the split decision in Jewel Tea, Connell represents
the view of a majority of the Court.2ss Connell has been criticized
for placing federal courts in the role of overseers of collective bar-
gaining agreements, in direct contravention of Congressional intent
as expressed in the labor laws,21 for ignoring important policy con-
siderations supporting union action, 25 and for exaggerating the
scope of the marketing restraints involved in the particular case.2rs
Conversely, some commentators have applauded Connell, stating
that the stricter nonstatutory exemption test recognized by the
Court comports with precedent and preserves Sherman Act poli-
cies.201
An analysis of Connell in the context of the decisions preceding
it permits a partial delineation of the scope of labor's antitrust
exemption. Initially, if a union acts unilaterally and in its own self-
interest, and does not combine with a nonlabor group, it is entitled
to the statutory labor exemption. When this union activity results
in a union-employer agreement, however, the court will scrutinize
the agreement according to the following criteria: first, the labor
exemption is inapplicable unless a bona fide union seeks to assert
it in furtherance of the union members' self-interests; second, pro-
viding the union meets this first criteria, it may not combine with
nonlabor groups in a conspiracy to impose market restraints; third,
§ 8(e) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970), Connell's remedies were provided exclusively
by the labor laws. 421 U.S. at 655.
203. See note 159 supra & accompanying text. The creation of this consensus was not
viewed positively by some commentators who believed that the decision in Connell further
dismantled union protection. See, e.g., Christensen, The Supreme Court's Labor Law Deci-
sions, October 1974 Term-Past, Prologue, and the Potomac Parallax, in LABOR LAW DEvEL-
OPMENTS 1976, PROCEEDINGS OF TWENTY-SEcoND ANNUAL INsTfTuE ON LAw 33, 39 (1976), who
states:
From the standpoint of legal analysis, the only favorable word that can be stated
about this decision is, indeed, that it indicates we now have a narrowly divided
Court with a majority "rationale" which can be defended or attacked. This is
some improvement on the anarchy which attended the prior split of the Court
into three groups of three justices, each group unable to obtain a consensus,
other than a bare result of the case at hand.
204. See Cohen, supra note 150, at 186; Comment, Labor's Exemption From FederalAnti-
trust Law: The Diminishing Protection for Union Activity, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 620, 635 (1976).
205. See Note, Diminution of Labor's Immunity Under Antitrust Law, 21 Loy. L. Ray. 980,
993 (1976).
206. See Cohen, supra note 150, at 171-73.
207. See, e.g., Janofsky & Hay, Connell-Consistent with Past, Indicative of the Future,
in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIvERSITY TwENTY-NINTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 3
(1976).
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a union may not restrict its discretion in future negotiations outside
the present bargaining unit; fourth, when a union pursues its self-
interest by entering into an agreement with a nonlabor party that
is alleged to restrain trade, a court must evaluate the agreement by
weighing the relevant competing policy considerations inherent in
the Sherman Act and the NLRA. Relative to this fourth criterion,
Jewel Tea suggests that the Supreme Court will tip the scales in
favor of labor if the labor policies are strong and the antitrust ramifi-
cations are comparatively weak. Connell, however, clearly demon-
strates that the Court will not apply the labor exemption in situa-
tions when an agreement that affects labor considerations only min-
imally creates a direct restraint on competition that contravenes the
fundamental policies of the Sherman Act.
The Court has not yet determined how it would resolve a situation
presenting equally strong labor and antitrust policy considerations.
Challenges to the player restraint system in the professional sports
industry may present the forum for the resolution of this issue.
THE LABOR EXEMPTION AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS CASES
The statutory exemption, designed to protect labor's traditional
organizational weapons such as the strike, the picket line, and the
secondary boycott from antitrust sanctions, is supplemented by a
limited nonstatutory exemption that protects unions from antitrust
liability if their organizational activity culminates in a collective
bargaining agreement with the employer.0 8 Employers have at-
tempted to extend this nonstatutory exemption by reasoning that
its underpinning. is the national policy in favor of collective bargain-
ing and that, consequently, an employer should receive a derivative
exemption from suit whenever the union would enjoy immunity.209
Especially in the professional sports industry, team owners consis-
tently have sought to wrap themselves in the mantel of the labor
exemption in their attempts to achieve antitrust immunity.210 Sev-
eral courts have acknowledged that a sports league may qualify for
antitrust immunity if an employer-owner can establish that the
collective bargaining agreement in question is the product of bona
208. See notes 191-207 supra & accompanying text.
209. See Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of
Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1, 26-27 (1971).
210. See note 220-85 infra & accompanying text.
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fide collective bargaining." ' The owners, however, generally have
been unsuccessful in meeting this burden of proof.
Flood v. Kuhn212 was the first case in which professional sports
team owners raised the labor exemption as a defense. The owners
argued that even if baseball's special exemption from the antitrust
laws 23 was discontinued, the labor exemption nevertheless would
immunize the reserve clause from antitrust attack. The owners in-
sisted that they qualified for the labor exemption because the re-
serve clause was a mandatory subject of bargaining and an integral
part of a collective bargaining agreement negotiated between the
Major League Players Association and the league. 21
Although the majority opinion in Flood failed to discuss the labor
exemption issue,'215 Justice Marshall suggested in his dissent that
the exemption might be relevant in the context of professional
sports.216 Flood argued that the labor exemption was inappropriate
because the owners thrust the reserve clause on the players and
never permitted it to be an issue of serious collective bargaining.217
Furthermore, Flood insisted that the types of antitrust violations
against which labor and management could be immunized were
limited. 2 1 Although the Court rejected Justice Marshall's sugges-
tion that Flood be remanded to clarify these issues, 219 subsequent
cases have provided insight into their possible resolution.
Five months after Flood Judge Higgenbotham in Philadelphia
World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc.220 ad-
dressed several of the issues raised by Justice Marshall. The court
rejected the NHL's claimed entitlement to a labor exemption based
211. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976); Smith v.
Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976); Robertson v. National Basketball League, 389
F. Supp. 867, 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). But see Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp.
73, 86 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club,
Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 500 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
212. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
213. See notes 4-12 supra & accompanying text.
214. 407 U.S. at 283.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 293-94 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In his opinion, Justice Marshall cited cases
involving union-management agreements detrimental to management's competitors; he rec-
ognized, however, that these cases possibly were distinguishable from the situation in Flood,
in which the reserve system allegedly was injurious to labor. Id. at 294.
217. Id. at 295.
218. Id. at 295-96.
219. Id. at 296.
220. 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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on the existence of a collective bargaining relationship with the
National Hockey League Players Association,22 ' noting that histori-
cally the labor exemption had been granted only to unions acting
in their own self-interest.2 22 The NHL presented no evidence show-
ing that the Players Association had endeavored to create or retain
the reserve clause;2 to the contrary, the court was persuaded that:
The evidence establishes the Players' Association's persistent
opposition to the present form of reserve system. The reserve
clause, in fact, was more than a sturdy teenager when the Players'
Association was born. The reserve clause was fathered by the
NHL, and the Players' Association has repeatedly sought to ex-
clude it in its present form.224
Concluding that the reserve clause was not the product of good
faith, arm's-length bargaining between the employer and the union,
the court held that the NHL could not claim the labor exemption.225
Considering the issue further, the court reasoned:
[E]ven if, arguendo, there had been substantial arm's-length
collective bargaining by the National Hockey League and the
Players' Association to revise the perpetual option provision of
the reserve clause . . ., those negotiations would not shield the
National Hockey League from liability in a suit by outside com-
petitors who sought access to players under the control of the
National Hockey League. 2 18
Although the court did not express clearly its rationale for this im-
portant conclusion, Judge Higgenbotham apparently assumed that
any union participation in the formulation of a modified reserve
clause would constitute a conspiracy between the union and the
221. Id. at 496.
222. Id. at 498.
223. Id. at 499.
224. Id. at 498.
225. Id. at 499-500.
226. Id. at 499. In reaching this conclusion, the court stated:
A stronger argument might be made by a newly-formed league that a collec-
tive agreement between an established league and players' union which, for
example, permitted suits for injunction against players who attempted to
"jump" leagues, was designed to prevent the new league from gaining access to
the best players and to consign it permanently to second class status. This claim
is similar to the one which succeeded in Allen Bradley: a union-employer combi-
nation to exclude entry by newcomers.
Id. at 499 (quoting Jacobs & Winter, supra note 209, at 28). The court's analysis understand-
ably was persuasive in a case involving the newly-formed World Hockey Association.
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employer to exclude new entrants from the industry.22 The court
insisted that the "NHL can do no more than could the employers
and union in Allen Bradley. "2 s The assumption was unjustifiedly
broad. For example, although a one year option clause would impose
a barrier to new entrants, the Players Association could bargain for
such a rule for the self-interested reasons of maintaining competi-
tive balance and stability within the industry. In that event, the
policy favoring collective bargaining presumably would outweigh
that promoting free competition, and the rule should be sustained.
The court's c6nclusive presumption that the resulting agreement
would constitute an illegal combination is reminiscent of Justice
Douglas' concurrence in Pennington,2 1 a view never accepted by a
majority of the Supreme Court. Jewel Tea and Connell suggest that
the imposition by a union acting in its own self-interest of a contract
condition with anticompetitive effects would require a court to
balance the conflicting policies underlying the NLRA and the Sher-
man Act.230 A court's conclusive presumption of a conspiracy would
ignore the tribunal's duty to balance the relevant legislative poli-
cies.
In Kapp v. National Football Leaguez3' the court circumvented
the issues of Kapp's standing to initiate suit22 and of the labor
exemption's application by observing that Kapp signed his contract
before the NFLPA had negotiated a collective bargaining agreement
with the league. Moreover, because Kapp was pressured out of the
league prior to the agreement's acceptance, he was not bound by its
provisions.2 3 Kapp demonstrates that whatever antitrust immunity
an employer achieves by entering into a collective bargaining agree-
ment, the immunity will extend only to employees who were mem-
bers of the bargaining unit sometime during the agreement's exist-
227. 351 F. Supp. at 499-500.
228. Id. at 500. For a discussion of Allen Bradley, see text accompanying notes 144-49
supra.
229. See note 157 supra.
230. See 421 U.S. at 621-22; 381 U.S. at 689.
231. 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974). For a discussion of the facts and the antitrust issues
in Kapp, see notes 57-71 supra & accompanying text.
232. Courts consistently have permitted individual players to contest player restraint pro-
visions, although these provisions appear in collective bargaining agreements. Allowing indi-
vidual athletes to contest the legality of collective bargaining agreements in situations in
which a players' association is the duly authorized bargaining agent, however, poses certain
dangers. See text accompanying note 237 infra.
233. 390 F. Supp. at 86.
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ence. 4 Thus, one commentator has suggested that, "because no
new collective bargaining agreement was entered into when the
1970-1974 agreement expired, it seems that no 'labor exemption'
defense may be successfully asserted by the NFL to antitrust claims
that may be made against it arising out of actions taken after Janu-
ary 31, 1974."231
After the court had determined that the collective bargaining
agreement did not pertain to Kapp, it further asserted that if the
NFL Standard Players Contract requirements had been accepted
through collective bargaining and had been applicable to Kapp:
there would still remain the question, well put by [Justice] Mar-
shall ... in Flood, . . . as to what are "the limits to the antitrust
violations to which labor and management can agree." We are of
the opinion that, however broad may be the exemption from anti-
trust laws of collective bargaining agreements dealing with
wages, hours and other conditions of employment, that exemp-
tion does not and should not go so far as to permit immunized
combinations to enforce employer-employee agreements which,
being unreasonable restrictions on an employee's right to freely
seek and choose his employment, have been held illegal on,
grounds of public policy long before and entirely apart from the
antitrust laws.26
Such an individual right to contract as that accepted by the court
in Kapp would deprive the NFLPA of its bargaining leverage. A
union has a legitimate interest in presenting a united front in its
confrontations with management and a concomitant interest in
avoiding the dissipation of its strength by restricting the rights of
subgroups within the unit from pursuing their individual goals sepa-
rately. A union's authority clearly will be undermined if individual
union members may avoid the collective bargaining agreement's
terms. 2
37
A union in a particular sport might agree to a modified player
restraint system if the team owners offer equivalent concessions.
Also, a players association might conclude that industry stability is
in its self-interest and that some form of a player restraint system
234. See id. at 85.
235. See L. SoBEL, supra note 3, at 318.
236. 390 F. Supp. at 86.
237. See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organ., 420 U.S.
50 (1975); Jacobs & Winter, supra note 209, at 27.
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is necessary to achieve this stability. The player restraint issue has
served as a significant impetus in bringing players unions and pro-
fessional sports leagues together. The leagues consider a player re-
straint system to be essential for the economic vitality of the indus-
try. Irrespective of whether a players association shares the owners'
conviction that such a mechanism induces competitive balance,
which in turn leads to increased fan interest and profits, it realizes
that the player restraint issue is its strongest bargaining chip in
negotiations with team owners. By restricting the scope of legiti-
mate collective bargaining, however, Kapp might weaken the un-
ions' newly-acquired position and increase the likelihood of unman-
ageable labor strife in the sports industry.2
Even if a negotiated player restraint system is illegal on public
policy grounds, as suggested by the court in Kapp, its vulnerability
to antitrust attack is not a necessary result. If a contract violates
p.ublic policy, a court may declare it void; moreover, if the contract
were to run afoul of the NLRA, it would become a nullity and
unenforceable. The antitrust statutes, however, contain harsh pen-
alties designed to deter parties from engaging in anticompetitive
conduct. The denial of the labor exemption on broad public policy
grounds, consequently, not only would multiply the number of
collective bargaining agreements susceptible to antitrust sanctions
but also could encourage frivolous suits designed to harass the par-
ties to such agreements.
The rise of new leagues inevitably creates pressures for the owners
of both the old and new leagues to merge to eliminate expensive
bidding wars."' When the NBA and the ABA were reported to be
238. See 4 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 581, 595 (1976).
239. See Noll, The US. Team Sports Industry: An Introduction, in GOVERNMENT AND THE
SPoRTs BUSINEss 6 (R. Noll ed. 1974), who states:
During periods of interleague competition, the agreements not to compete
within a league cease to be effective in preventing competitive bidding for play-
ers. When a new league is formed, the following sequence of events normally
occurs. First, the financial strength of the new enterprise is tested during several
years of increasingly intense competition for players, which causes player sala-
ries to rise substantially. Eventually, the new league proves that its financial
backing is adequate to survive the competition-and to cause financial losses
to the established league. The second phase is then entered, during which the
leagues negotiate a merger. To the fans, a merger means an interleague champi-
onship playoff and, in all sports but baseball, interleague play during the regular
season. To the owners, a merger brings about an agreement among all teams in
the sport to limit the competition for players. Thus, the reserve and option
clauses, with their limited efficacy during interleague competition, become se-
cure again through mutual agreement.
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near agreement on a merger in the spring of 1970, the NBA Players'
Association filed suit, claiming that NBA player restraints violated
the antitrust laws and that the proposed merger also constituted an
antitrust violation in that it was an anticompetitive agreement in
restraint of trade. In denying the NBA's motion for summary judg-
ment, the court in Robertson v. National Basketball Associationu
rejected the NBA's contentions that the plaintiffs lacked standing
to challenge the various player restraints24 1 and that the labor ex-
emption protected the league from antitrust attack.2 12 The NBA
argued that the players were precluded from seeking, through anti-
trust litigation, the right to negotiate freely with any team of their
choice.243 This goal, according to the NBA, conflicted with the
NLRA's "commitment to a bargaining system which 'of necessity
subordinates the interests of an individual employee to the collec-
tive interests of all employees.' ",244 Judge Carter rejected this argu-
ment that members of a bargaining unit lacked standing to bring
antitrust suits against their employers:
Section 4 of the Clayton Act. . .grants standing for antitrust
suits to any "person who shall be injured in his business or prop-
erty by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."
Courts have consistently allowed plaintiffs to sue their employers
for alleged antitrust violations of the nature here asserted.2 15
The NBA also contended that the suit was barred by the labor
exemption.2 11 In dismissing this assertion, Judge Carter emphasized
240. 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
241. Id. at 882-84.
242. Id. at 884-90.
243. Id. at 881.
244. Id. at 882 (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967)).
245. 389 F. Supp. at 882. The court relied on the following non-sports cases: Anderson v.
Shipowners Ass'n, 272 U.S. 359 (1926) (Seamen's Union member challenged use of employ-
ment registry); Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967) (book sales-
man sued former employer and another publisher for refusal to hire); Cordova v. Bochet Co.,
321 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)(stockbroker sued firms that unilaterally had agreed to
reduce commissions paid). In addition, the court cited numerous sports cases in which stand-
ing had been extended to player-plaintiffs. See, e.g., Radovich v. National Football League,
352 U.S. 445 (1957); Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974);
Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Philadelphia
World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971), stay
vacated sub nom. Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (Douglas, Circuit
Justice, 1971).
246. 389 F. Supp. at 882.
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that the labor exemption was created for the benefit of unions, 4 '
thus supporting the rationale that the exemption's purpose was to
immunize certain union practices that would be illegal if conducted
by businessmen. 5 The court acknowledged:
the possibility of a circumscribed exemption for employers, which
might arise derivately, and become effective when employers are
sued by third parties for the activities of unions, [but] the pro-
tection of the exemption is afforded only to employers who have
acted jointly with the labor organization in connection with or in
preparation for collective bargaining negotiations. 49
Moreover, the court considered and rejected a proposed test that the
NBA claimed should be used to determine when the exemption is
available to employers. The NBA had urged that:
"[t]he test for applicability of the labor exemption which
emerges from Jewel Tea and Pennington, is twofold: 1) Are the
challenged practices directed against non-parties to the relation-
ship; if they are not, then 2) are they mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining? If the answer to No. 1 is no, and to No. 2
yes, the practices are immune ... "2,1
Judge Carter found no support for this test in prior decisions ' and
held that the question of whether the practices relate to mandatory
subjects of collective bargaininge2 was irrelevant.5 3 Instead, he in-
sisted that "'[m]andatory subjects of collective bargaining' do not
carry talismanic immunity from the antitrust laws."2 4 The court
nevertheless concluded that the NBA's player restraint system was
not a mandatory subject of bargaining. 5
Judge Carter endorsed the Second Circuit's decision in
Intercontinental Container Transport Corp. v. New York Shipping
247. Id. at 885.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 886.
250. Id. (quoting from the NBA Memorandum, at 28).
251. 389 F. Supp. at 887-88.
252. Section 8(d) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970), requires "the employer and the
representatives of the employees to confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment." Thus, these matters are considered to be manda-
tory subjects of collective bargaining. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356
U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
253. 389 F. Supp. at 889.
254. Id. at 888.
255. Id. at 889.
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Association,256 which provided a two-part test for determining the
applicability of the labor exemption: "(1) whether the action is in
the union's self-interest in an area which is a proper subject of union
concern and (2) whether the union is acting in combination with a
group of employers.""2 ' The court in Robertson stressed that the
critical issue in ascertaining whether player restraints could qualify
for the labor exemption was whether they were the product of bona
fide collective bargaining,'5 8 acknowledging that, "conceivably, if
the restrictions were part of the union policy deemed by the Players
Association to be in the players' best interest, they could be exempt
from the reach of the antitrust laws. '2 59
The test adopted in Robertson for determining whether an agree-
ment is protected by the labor exemption is consistent with Connell.
Both cases clearly require that to qualify for the labor exemption a
union must act in its self-interest in an area of proper union concern
and must not combine with nonlabor groups in a conspiracy to
impose market restraints. Even when these prerequisites are satis-
fied, however, if an agreement is alleged to restrain trade, Connell
expressly mandates and Robertson impliedly directs a court to
256. 426 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1970).
257. Id. at 887. In Intercontinental a warehouse company asserted that the General Cargo
Agreement between the Longshoremen's Union and the New York Shipping Association
violated the antitrust laws. Pursuant to the agreement the union acquiesced to the associa-
tion's shift to containerization in return for concessions designed to preserve certain work
practices that allegedly prevented the warehouse company from competing with the associa-
tion. The court found this agreement protected by the labor exemption because it was in the
self-interest of the union and because, "far from aiding and abetting a violation of the
Sherman Act by a group of business men, the union here, acting solely in its own self-interest,
forced reluctant employers to yield to certain of its demands." Id. at 886-88.
258. 389 F. Supp. at 895. The court, however, declined to decide this factual question
because it was ruling only on a motion for summary judgment.
259. Id. Although the court could conceive of a possible collective bargaining agreement
that would qualify for the antitrust exemption, it considered such an eventuality highly
unlikely:
I must confess that it is difficult for me to conceive of any theory or set of
circumstances pursuant to which the college draft, blacklisting, boycotts and
refusals to deal could be saved from Sherman Act condemnation, even if defen-
dants were able to prove at trial their highly dubious contention that these
restraints were adopted at the behest of the Players Association. Plaintiffs, on
their part, have vigorously asserted that no collective bargaining ever took place
as to any of these restraints, and that certainly they are not the kind of matter
which a union would consider, seek or obtain as being in its own best interest
and that of its members. The life of these restrictions, therefore, appears to be




weigh the relevant competing policy considerations reflected in the
Sherman Act and in the NLRA.26°
Another important aspect of the holding in Robertson was the
court's determination that the question of whether the contested
portions of an agreement concerned mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining was an irrelevant consideration when determining the
applicability of the labor exemption in any particular situation.
This conclusion conflicts with decisions involving professional foot-
ball, however, which have held that a necessary but insufficient
prerequisite to the labor exemption is that the contested restraint
relate to a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.26'
In Smith v. Pro-Football"2 the NFL asserted the labor exemption
to avoid the plaintiff's antitrust challenge and attempted to estab-
lish that the retroactive effect of mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining prior to their embodiment in a contract supported the
exemption. The court found this argument totally unsupported by
precedent and in contravention of the fundamental policy consider-
ations on which the labor exemption was premised.263 The court
enunciated a firm rule: "[A] scheme advantageous to employers
and otherwise in violation of the antitrust laws cannot under any
circumstances come within the labor exemption unless and until it
becomes part of a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by a
union in its own self-interest." ' Because the plaintiff had signed his
contract prior to the ratification of the initial NFL-NFLPA collec-
tive bargaining agreement, the court would not bind the player to
the terms of that agreement. In addition, the league could not claim
that the agreement related back to cover the plaintiff because the
challenged draft occurred in January, 1968, before the NFLPA had
become the exclusive bargaining agent for purposes of determining
the availability of the labor exemption. 6'
Although the decision revolved on this timing issue, the court
discussed additional factors that the NFL would need to prove to
260. See notes 183-207 supra & accompanying text.
261. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Kapp v.
National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974). But see UMW v. Pennington,
381 U.S. 657, 665 (1965).
262. 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976). For an additional discussion of Smith, see notes
85-90 supra & accompanying text.
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immunize both itself and the draft from antitrust attack. To qualify
for the labor exemption, according to the court, the challenged re-
straint must involve a mandatory subject of collective bargaining,
it must be the product of genuine, arm's-length negotiation, and it
must not be "thrust upon" a weak players union by the owners.
21
If these conditions were satisfied, the agreement then would be ex-
amined to ascertain: (1) whether it was the type of unilateral, non-
collusive action protected by the statutory labor exemption; (2)
whether it was the type of illegal conspiracy to restrain trade con-
demned by Allen Bradley; or (3) whether it was a combination
between labor and management that would need to be evaluated for
its relative impact on the product market and the interests of union
members in the context of the national labor and antitrust poli-
cies.211
The court recognized that disputes concerning the draft would
involve issues not encountered by previous decisions. Prior cases
had involved restraints inimical to the employers' competitors. The
draft, however, worked to the detriment of "potential employees,
persons neither party to the agreement nor members of a union
which is party to the agreement. ' '268 The court nevertheless was
persuaded that an agreement embodying a college draft could be
within the scope of the labor exemption. 289 Although admitting that
the antitrust laws were concerned with restraints on the labor mar-
ket, the court believed that "such protection is somewhat less cen-
tral to the objectives of the antitrust laws" and concluded that those
laws were concerned primarily with preventing restraints on the
product market.20 By contrast, the court determined that a central
purpose of the labor laws is to allow unions to negotiate bargains in
their best interests with respect to mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining. Thus, by completing the type of balancing test required
by Connell and by Justice White's opinion in Jewel Tea, the court,
in dictum, determined that, in a situation involving the college
draft, the labor policies deserved preeminence over the antitrust
policies.2'
266. Id. at 743.
267. Id.
268. Id.





The labor exemption defense again was raised and rejected in
Mackey v. National Football League, 22 an action challenging the
Rozelle Rule. On the basis of an extensive record the district court
held that the "exemption extends only to labor or union activities,
and not to the activities of employers. 2 3 Even if the labor exemp-
tion could apply derivatively to management in some instances, the
court would not have sanctioned such an extension under the facts
presented in Mackey.24 The court was persuaded that the product
in professional football for antitrust purposes consists of the players
and that the Rozelle Rule operated as a direct restraint on competi-
tion in this product market. In addition, the union did not consider
the Rozelle Rule to be in its self-interest. The court determined that
the Rozelle Rule was a nonmandatory subject of bargaining.2 5 No
bona fide collective bargaining had occurred with respect to the
Rozelle Rule in either of the two collective bargaining agreements
in question. Because the owners refused to bargain seriously on the
issue and because the union was too weak to compel such negotia-
tions, the item could not legitimately qualify for the labor exemp-
tion. ' The court emphasized that the league could not achieve
freedom from antitrust liability "simply because of the emergence
of collective bargaining with the union in 1968 and the union's ina-
bility to date to achieve the elimination of the Rozelle Rule through
the collective bargaining process. '
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit agreed that the labor exemption
was inapplicable but rested its conclusion on much narrower
grounds. 8 The court's discussion of the labor exemption is particu-
larly significant because it was the first appellate court to consider
this issue in the context of professional sports after the Supreme
Court's decision in Connell.
The appellate court reversed the district court's holding that only
employee groups, and not employers, are entitled to the labor ex-
272. 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir.
1976).
273. Id. at 1008.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1009.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 1010.
278. 543 F.2d at 616. The court of appeals reasoned that the mere continued presence of
the Rozelle Rule in the initial collective bargaining agreements between the NFL and the
NFLPA did not establish that the rule was a product of bona fide bargaining. Id. at 611-16.
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emption. According to the court, the benefits of the exemption logi-
cally must extend to both parties to the agreement; otherwise, the
exemption's underlying purpose of fostering collective bargaining
would be vitiated. 5 In determining whether the nonstatutory labor
exemption could be claimed by the NFL, the court recognized a
necessity to accommodate the relevant federal labor and federal
antitrust law policies. The court undertook a three-part analysis:
First, the labor policy favoring collective bargaining may poten-
tially be given preeminence over the antitrust laws where the
restraint on trade primarily affects only the parties to the collec-
tive bargaining relationship . . . .Second, federal labor policy is
implicated sufficiently to prevail only where the agreement
sought to be exempted concerns a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining.. . . Finally, the policy favoring collective bargaining
is furthered to the degree necessary to override the antitrust laws
only where the agreement sought to be exempted is the product
of bona fide arm's-length bargaining.2 °
Applying this test, the court determined that the Rozelle Rule's
alleged restraint on trade would affect only the parties to the agree-
ment for which the exemption was sought and that the rule was a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining. Regarding the final cri-
terion, however, the court concluded that the Rozelle Rule was not
the product of bona fide, arm's-length negotiation.28'
Thus, although concurring with the district court's holding that
the bona fide collective bargaining requirement had not been satis-
fied, the court of appeals disagreed with the lower court's holding
that the Rozelle Rule was a nonmandatory subject of bargaining.22
Federal labor law is the logical benchmark for determining what
qualifies as a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. The dis-
trict court's readiness to label a contract provision as a nonmanda-
tory subject on the basis of its illegality under the Sherman Act was
improper. The Eighth Circuit insisted that the "labor exemption
presupposes a violation of the antitrust laws. To hold that a subject
relating to wages, hours and working conditions becomes nonman-
datory by virtue of its illegality under the antitrust laws obviates the
279. Id. at 612.
280. Id. at 614 (citations and footnotes omitted).
281. Id. at 614-15.




Although other decisions suggested that an agreement containing
a player restraint comparable to the Rozelle Rule might never qual-
ify for the labor exemption, the Eighth Circuit in Mackey indicated
that the rule might qualify for the exemption under appropriate
circumstances: 8 4
[S]ince the Rozelle Rule, as implemented, concerns a manda-
tory subject of collective bargaining, any agreement as to inter-
team compensation for free agents moving to other teams,
reached through good faith collective bargaining, might very well
be immune from antitrust liability under the non-statutory labor
exemption.
It may be that some reasonable restrictions relating to player
transfers are necessary for the successful operation of the NFL.
The protection of mutual interests of both the players and the
clubs may indeed require this. The parties are far better situated
to agreeably resolve what rules governing player transfers are best
suited for their mutual interest than are the courts.
The court, by negative implication, held that if the restraint on
trade does not affect primarily only the parties to the collective
bargaining relationship, then the labor exemption would be inap-
propriate. By contrast, in his decision in Robertson, Judge Carter
determined that an inquiry into whether the alleged market re-
straints were directed at the agreement's parties would obscure the
most critical inquiry, which was whether the controverted practices
were in the union's own interest. A restraint's effect on nonparties
to a collective bargaining agreement certainly is a relevant consider-
ation, but this factor is not invariably dispositive. For instance, in
Connell the Court left unanswered the question of whether the labor
exemption would be available to a collective bargaining agreement
containing a clause prohibiting the employer from subcontracting
work that normally is performed by members of the bargaining unit.
Whether such a provision, in preserving work opportunities, primar-
ily affects the parties to the agreement or whether the clause pri-
marily operates to prevent outside subcontractors from bidding
competitively on bargaining unit work is debatable. Such clauses
are common in collective bargaining agreements and thus create an
283. Id.
284. Id. at 623.
285. Id.
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instance in which "labor policy requires tolerance for the lessening
of business competition based on differences in wages and working
conditions." '
In Mackey the court concluded that, before the labor exemption
can attach, the agreement's provision sought to be exempted must
concern a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. The signifi-
cance that should be attributed to mandatory subjects of bargaining
when determining the applicability of the labor exemption was a
point of contention between Justices White and Goldberg in their
respective opinions in Jewel Tea and Pennington. Justice Goldberg
argued that all provisions of negotiated contracts relating to manda-
tory subjects of bargaining should be immune from antitrust suit. 8 '
Moreover, he stated that he did not "believe that Congress intended
that activity involving all nonmandatory subjects of bargaining be
similarly exempt."' 8 Although provisions concerning nonmanda-
tory subjects of collective bargaining clearly would not qualify for
an automatic exemption, Justice Goldberg did not assert that such
provisions could never qualify for the labor exemption. In contrast,
Justice White in Jewel Tea expressed "serious doubt" that a union
or an employer could invoke the labor exemption if the challenged
agreement concerned a nonmandatory subject of bargaining.29 Fur-
thermore, Justice White disagreed that collective bargaining agree-
ments involving mandatory subjects of collective bargaining neces-
sarily were exempt from the purview of the antitrust laws. 90 In
Connell the Court largely ignored the question of mandatory sub-
jects of collective bargaining. Thus, the Supreme Court has not
resolved the issue of whether the labor exemption is available only
to those contested contract provisions resulting from negotiations
over mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.
Any requirement that agreements qualifying for the labor exemp-
tion must concern a mandatory subject of collective bargaining is
unwise. In Robertson the court regarded that fact as largely irrele-
vant in its analysis of the NBA's labor exemption argument. The
proper focus, rather, should be whether the negotiated agreement
concerns matters intimately related to legitimate union goals. This
286. 421 U.S. at 622.
287. See notes 168-71 supra & accompanying text.
288. 381 U.S. at 732.
289. 381 U.S. at 689.
290. See UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 664-65; Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters
v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. at 689; notes 157, 170 supra.
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approach would be prudent particularly in professional sports, an
area in which the NLRB has not delineated precisely which union
demands will be considered as mandatory subjects of collective bar-
gaining.
THE NFL-NFLPA COLLECTvE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
In the context of these numerous judicial decisions and after three
years of labor controversy that had failed to produce a collective
bargaining agreement, 9' the NFL and the NFLPA on February 16,
1977, entered into a tentative agreement.2 92 Subsequent to its en-
dorsement by the player representatives, the players, and the own-
ers, the five-year agreement was approved by Judge Larson,293 whose
jurisdiction had arisen from the controversy in Mackey.294 The
agreement in essence contains the following features:1. a modified draft consisting of twelve rounds rather than sev-
enteen, as in the previous draft.2 5
2. a right of first refusal/compensation system that modifies the
Rozelle Rule. Pursuant to its right of first refusal, a free agent's
original team may retain the player if it matches the offer he desires
to accept from a new club. If the first team fails to exercise its right
of first refusal, the free' agent and the acquiring club will be deemed
to have entered into a binding agreement, and the athlete's original
club may qualify to receive one or more of the new club's draft
choices as compensation. This new compensation system has elimi-
nated the discretion held by the Commissioner under the Rozelle
Rule to award compensation when the two teams could not reach a
satisfactory agreement. Under the new plan, the draft choices that
the acquiring team must surrender are based on the free agent's
salary with his new club and on the number of years of credited
service he has earned under the NFL's retirement plan. The more
291. During these three years of conflict the NFL and NFLPA had no valid collective
bargaining agreement, and professional football was the object of two preseason player
strikes, numerous law suits, and much animosity. Wash. Post, Feb. 18, 1977, at D1, col. 4.
292. N.Y. Times, March 6, 1977, § 5, at 7, col. 1.
293. The court granted preliminary approval on March 5, 1977, and final approval on
August 1, 1977.
294. For a discussion of Mackey, see notes 72-83, 272-85 supra & accompanying text.
295. Collective Bargaining Agreement between National Football League Players Associa-
tion & National Football League Management Council art. XI (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Football Collective Bargaining Agreement]. See also N.Y. Times, March 6, 1977, § 5, at 7,
col. 3. For a description of the modified draft, see text accompanying note 308 infra.
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years of credited service a free agent has earned, the larger a salary
he must be offered before his previous employer becomes entitled
to receive compensation. Subject to this limitation, a team signing
a free agent for $50,000 to $65,000 per year must surrender a third
round draft choice; it must provide a second round draft choice for
a salary of $65,000 to $75,000, a first round choice for a salary of
$75,000 to $125,000, a first and a second choice for a salary of
$125,000 to $200,000, and two first choices for salaries over
$200,000.296
3. an agency shop provision and a union dues check off provi-
sion, both essential to the survival of the NFLPA, which had experi-
enced significant financial trouble because of loss of membership.2 7
4. a resolution of several minor "freedom issues" for the play-
ers.
2 98
5. an increase in minimum salaries, pre-season pay for veterans,
and post-season playoff compensation.
6. a provision prohibiting the inclusion of option clauses in the
contracts of athletes who have played four or more years in the NFL,
unless such a clause has been negotiated individually by the player
and his club. Moreover, whenever a player's contract contains an
option clause, the option-year salary must be at least 110% of the
athlete's previous year's salary.299
7. greatly augmented pension payments.
8. a no strike clause that will be in effect for the duration of the
agreement.
9. authority for the owners to increase the regular season sched-
ule from fourteen to sixteen games.3 "
10. a monetary settlement of $13,675,000 in a class action dis-
pute arising from the controversy in Mackey."'
296. See Football Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 295, art. XV.
297. Football Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 295, art. IV, §§ 1-2. See N.Y.
Times, March 6, 1977, § 5, at 7, col. 2. All players who entered the NFL after February 1,
1974, must pay union dues regardless of whether they are members of the NFLPA. Football
Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 295, art. IV, § 1.
298. N.Y. Times, March 6, 1977, § 5, at 7, col. 2. For example, the agreement allows players
to have telephones in their rooms during training camp and removes arbitrary grooming
codes. Football Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 295, art. V, § 2; art. XXI, § 7.
299. See Football Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 295, art. XIV, §§ 1, 3.
300. See Football Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 295, art. XXI, § 5: art.
XXII, § 7; art. XXXII, § 2; N.Y. Times, March 6, 1977, § 5, at 7, col. 3.
301. See Football Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 295, app. D; N.Y. Times,
Feb. 26, 1977, at 15, col. 4.
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This Article will now discuss the relevant factors to be considered
in a determination of whether the NFL-NFLPA agreement, or a
similar collective bargaining agreement containing the above provi-
sions, should qualify for the labor exemption from the antitrust
laws.
THE LABOR EXEMPTION AND THE NFL-NFLPA COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT
Despite the volume of litigation concerning player restraints in
professional sports, courts generally have avoided a thorough analy-
sis of the labor exemption issue in this context on the rationale that
reserve clauses and other player restraints have not been the prod-
uct of bona fide collective bargaining. Although collective bargain-
ing arguably could reduce the tensions created between the anti-
trust and the labor laws, an astute commentator, Professor Winter,
suggested the inconclusiveness of any such general thesis some years
ago.302 Nevertheless, Theodore Kheel, a prominent labor attorney
and counsel for the NFL, stated recently that "antitrust is over for
keeps in professional sports on the reserve systems. We are now in
collective bargaining. ' 30 3 Moreover, several sports cases have sug-
gested that, if the players and the leagues engaged in genuine bar-
gaining, the resulting agreement might qualify for the labor exemp-
tion.
Connell and the cases it embraces, however, make precarious at
best predictions concerning the triumph of labor law over antitrust
law in professional sports. The Supreme Court has identified two
types of labor exemptions: statutory and nonstatutory. The statu-
tory exemption is inapplicable to collective bargaining agreements
between the players and the various leagues because it does not
extend protection when a union joins with a nonlabor party in a
negotiated contract that creates market restraints. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court has recognized that the national labor policy of
encouraging collective bargaining requires that some union-
employer agreements qualify for a limited nonstatutory exemption.
In such circumstances the following threshold requirements must be
present: (1) the collective bargaining agreement must be the prod-
302. See Winter, supra note 116.
303. See Kheel, Professional Sports: Has Antitrust Killed the Goose that Laid the Golden
Egg?, 45 ANTrrRusT L.J. 290, 314 (1977).
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uct of bona fide collective bargaining; (2) the union may not enter
into the agreement as part of a union-employer conspiracy to impose
market restraints; and (3) the contract must not restrict the union's
bargaining options in its dealings with those who are not parties to
the agreement. Moreover, Connell clearly demonstrates that, prior
to resolving finally the applicability of the nonstatutory labor ex-
emption, courts must balance or accommodate the national labor
policies with those underlying the antitrust laws.
The requirement of bona fide collective bargaining has been the
chief obstacle encountered by professional sports leagues in their
prior attempts to invoke the nonstatutory labor exemption. Before
the players had formed unions, the leagues already had developed
a firmly entrenched system of player restraints. Team owners re-
fused to negotiate seriously over changes in these player restraints,
asserting that the restrictions were essential to the continued exist-
ence of the industry. ' "4 Frustrated at the bargaining table and ap-
parently too weak to take effective strike action, the players turned
to the courts in an att;.mpt to have the restraints declared illegal.
As already discussed, courts uniformly rejected the labor exemption
defense to these antitrust suits and held that the owners unilaterally
had imposed the restraints on the players. Thus, in the recent NFL-
NFLPA negotiations, the Players Association was able to engage for
the first time in serious collective b.argaining over player restraints.
The apparent success of the players in their antitrust suits, however,
must not be exaggerated. During the negotiations, the NFLPA was
hampered by the effects of an unsuccessful strike in 1974, which had
demonstrated the difficulty of attaining player solidarity amidst
inadequate finances and dissension among veterans, rookies, and
superstars. Despite the existence of factors limiting the NFLPA's
strength, Mackey, Kapp, and Smith afforded the union its first
opportunity to engage in realistic collective bargaining, and the
NFL-NFLPA agreement consequently should qualify as a product
of bona fide collective bargaining.
The second threshold requirement is that a union and an em-
ployer may not conspire to impose market restraints through collec-
tive bargaining. This rule is not violated when a reluctant employer
submits to union pressure and grants terms or conditions of employ-
ment that also have an incidental anticompetitive effect. If a union
304. Id. at 307-08.
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exercises its powers in an attempt to further the interests of an
employer who actively seeks to impose a market restraint, however,
both the union and the employer are susceptible to antitrust suit.
Moreover, under Allen Bradley, a union conspiring with an em-
ployer to impose market restraints may be subject to antitrust lia-
bility even when it undeniably is acting to further its own self-
interest. In the NFL-NFLPA collective bargaining agreement the
Players Association accepted a modified form of the'player restraint
system that the club owners consistently have maintained was vital
for the industry. The NFLPA obtained modifications to the tradi-
tional restraints, however, only after engaging in strenuous collec-
tive bargaining with a reluctant management, a factor that immedi-
ately distinguishes the NFL-NFLPA agreement from the conspiracy
in Allen Bradley. On balance, then, the NFLPA and the NFL did
not adopt a common conspiratorial design to impose market re-
straints; rather, each party engaged in bona fide collective bargain-
ing to reach the settlement most conducive to its respective inter-
ests.
The third threshold requirement for qualification for the labor
exemption presently is irrelevant in the context of professional foot-
ball. The players association enjoys a collective bargaining relation-
ship only with the NFL, and therefore, no possibility exists that the
union could contravene the Supreme Court's decision in Pennington
by restricting its bargaining options with nonlabor groups other
than the NFL.
Of the three threshold requirements, the NFL-NFLPA agreement
is most susceptible to attack under the Allen Bradley non-
conspiracy qualification. As previously discussed, however, such an
attack should not be successful. Moreover, the agreement is remark-
able in that it does not patently infringe any of the three restric-
tions. Thus, for the first time, courts may analyze, according to the
balancing test used in Connell, the labor exemption's availability
for a bona fide, collectively bargained, modified player restraint
system.
Any attempt to apply Connell, however, is fraught with dangers,
particularly in the context of professional sports. Initially, the
employer-employee relationship in professional sports cannot be
compared easily with similar relationships existing in other indus-
tries. For example, labor customarily has argued for an expansive
intepretation of the labor exemption; employers typically have in-
sisted that a broad application of antitrust law is necessary to curb
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union excesses. In the sports cases, ironically, the owner-employers
and the player-employees have reversed their traditional ap-
proaches to the labor exemption. Connell was the Supreme Court's
most hostile treatment of the labor exemption, and focusing on the
decision's strong language, commentators have indicated that it will
become the leading case in a new strict and narrow interpretation
of the nonstatutory exemption.3 5 Arguably, however, Connell can be
limited to its facts."6 The union-nonlabor agreement in that case
was pernicious in that the union had no interest in organizing Con-
nell's employees and was content to force the company to deal with
subcontractors having collective bargaining agreements with the
union. Under these extreme circumstances, only a narrow majority
of the Justices joined Justice Powell's opinion for the Court.37 The
recent NFL-NFLPA contract clearly is distinguishable from the sit-
uation in Connell in that the signatories to the agreement have a
collective bargaining relationship with one another, and the Court
expressly left open the possibility that a contract resulting from
such circumstances could qualify for the labor exemption. Thus,
although often overlooked by commentators and the lower federal
courts, the question remains as to what weight the presence of a
collective bargaining relationship should be given.
Assuming that the Court would extend Connell to cover the NFL-
NFLPA agreement, caution should be exercised. As previously
noted, the non-statutory exemption seeks to accommodate and bal-
ance the conflicting policies of the national labor laws with those of
the antitrust laws. In its analyses the Court has favored the policy
involving important ramifications in the particular case. Unfortu-
nately, the Court has not yet confronted a situation in which the
labor law and the antitrust law considerations both were significant.
Consequently, its decisions in Connell and the other labor exemp-
tion cases provide little guidance to lower courts that must decide
whether antitrust law or labor law will prevail in a situation when
the collective bargaining process is fostered by an agreement impos-
ing direct market restraints. Despite this confusion, to qualify for
305. See notes 203-07 supra & accompanying text.
306. Connell involved a particularly aggressive organizing technique, top-down organizing,
in the construction industry, which historically has been given atypical treatment by the
Supreme Court; presumably in deference to the importance of the industry in the national
economic policy. For a discussion of Connell, see notes 183-203 supra & accompanying text.
307. See note 190 supra.
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the labor exemption, the NFL, having satisfied the three threshold
requirements, still must satisfy Connell's balancing test, although
its application and ultimate resolution are essentially speculative
matters. The difficulty of applying Connell can be demonstrated by
examining whether the two most important aspects of the NFL-
NFLPA agreement, the modified player draft and the compensation
plan, would qualify for the labor exemption.
A. The Player Draft
The modified player draft provides for a twelve round selection
procedure and requires that a club offer a contract with a minimum
salary, a "required tender," to any of its draftees with whom it
desires to preserve its exclusive right of negotiation. These provi-
sions are likely to become an immediate source of controversy
among potential professional athletes who are subject to the draft.
Obviously, the owners succeeded in maintaining the draft virtually
intact, inasmuch as the reduced number of rounds extends full bar-
gaining power only to those marginal athletes who are not among
the 336 players selected. The agreement alters the effect of the draft,
however, in several ways. To preserve its exclusive right to negotiate
with one of its draftees, a club must make a required tender to the
athlete on or before June 7 in the year of the draft. A required tender
must contain one of four separate minimum salary terms: a $20,000
salary for one year; a $30,000 average annual salary for two years; a
$40,000 average annual salary for three years; or a $50,000 average
annual salary for four years. If the team fails to make a required
tender, the drafted playerbecomes a free agent on June 8. If, how-
ever, the player receives a required tender but refuses to sign a
contract during the year following the draft, he becomes eligible to
be drafted by any NFL club in the subsequent draft. If the player
again refuses to sign a contract within one year with the club that
selects him in the subsequent draft, he becomes a free agent at the
end of that year and may negotiate with any team. 08
One problem with this system is that the draft restricts the bar-
gaining flexibility and power of individuals who are not yet a part
of the bargaining unit.0 9 College superstars are the persons injured
308. Football Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 295, art. XII, §§ 2-7.
309. Id. Preamble. The Preamble of the agreement states: "[Tihe NFLPA is recognized
by the Management Council as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of present
and future professional football players employed by the clubs. . . ." (emphasis supplied).
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most by the provisions restricting their right to bargain with more
than one team. These disgruntled amateurs may question whether
they should be bound by a collective bargaining agreement negoti-
ated by a players union whose members possess vested interests
arguably conflicting with those of the drafted players. During the
NFL-NFLPA negotiations, the common feeling was that "[t]he
players wanted a college draft, too. They feared that with unre-
stricted bidding a few players would get the world and the rest
would have to take what was left."3t 0 If the clubs were required to
pay large salaries to the young stars, they arguably would have fewer
resources with which to compensate the established players and
unheralded rookies. Thus, limiting the bargaining power of these
future professional athletes presumably was in the interest of both
the teams and the NFLPA. An analysis of the propriety of the
collective bargaining provision relating to the player draft requires
both an inquiry into the union's duty of fair representation to the
amateurs seeking pro status through the draft and an application
of Connell's balancing approach to the competing policy interests
involved.
1. The Duty of Fair Representation3 '
In construing the federal labor law, which authorizes a union
receiving a majority vote from those employees within the bargain-
ing unit to serve as the exclusive bargaining agent for the entire
unit,312 the Supreme Court in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
Railroad313 acknowledged the doctrine of fair representation. Under
310. Smith, Three Years War, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1977, § 5, at 3, col. 6.
311. A comprehensive analysis of the duty of fair representation is beyond the scope of this
Article. For a more extensive discussion of this issue, see R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR
LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ch. XXX (1976); Clark, The Duty of Fair
Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEx. L. REv. 1119 (1973); Flynn & Higgins, Fair
Representation: A Survey of the Contemporary Framework and a Proposed Change in the
Duty Owed to the Employee, 8 SUFFOLK L. Rav. 1096 (1974); Lehmann, The Union's Duty of
Fair Representation-Steele and its Successors, 30 FED. B.J. 280 (1971); Comment, Union's
Duty of Fair Representation Held to be Breached by Negligent Failure to Act on Behalf of
Members, 44 FORDHAM L. Rv. 1062 (1976).
312. See NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970). Section 9(a) provides in pertinent part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by a majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be
the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
or other conditions of employment ....
313. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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this doctrine, unions, as exclusive bargaining agents, have the obli-
gation to represent fairly, adequately, and impartially the interests
of all members of the bargaining unit, not merely union members:
The fair interpretation of the statutory language is that the or-
ganization chosen to represent a craft is to represent all its mem-
bers, the majority as well as the minority, and it is to act for and
not against those whom it represents. It is a principle of general
application that the exercise of a granted power to act in behalf
of others involves the assumption toward them of a duty to exer-
cise the power in their interest and behalf, and that such a grant
of power will not be deemed to dispense with all duty toward
those for whom it is exercised unless so expressed .31
Although the extent of the duty of fair representation is unclear, the
Supreme Court held in Vaca v. Sipes315 that this duty is violated
when the union's conduct toward a member of the collective bar-
gaining unit is "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith."3"' Rather
than resolving the duty of fair representation question, however,
Vaca prompted additional controversy.317
The ultimate resolution of the duty of fair representation issue
probably will not affect an analysis of the NFL's modified player
draft. A union's fair representation duty generally is limited to both
union and nonunion employees who are members of the bargaining
unit and normally does not extend to outside parties '.31  Drafted
athletes are not employees of the bargaining unit represented by the
314. Id. at 202. Steele involved an interpretation of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§
151-188 (1970). Nevertheless, the NLRA also imposes a duty of fair representation on the
union. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 306 U.S. 171 (1967); Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23, 350 U.S.
892 (1955) (per curiam); R. GoRmAN, supra note 311, at 695-98; Flynn & Higgins, supra note
311, at 1101-02.
315. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
316. Id. at 190.
317. Compare Local 313, ILWU v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 441 F.2d 1061 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972) and Dill v. Greyhound Corp., 435 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 952 (1971), with DeArroys v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse,
425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970) and Ruzicks v. General Motors Corp.,
336 F.2d 824 (6th Cir. 1975). See authorities cited at note 311 supra. The authorities are
divided over whether a union violates its duty of fair representation in instances in which its
conduct is merely negligent or perfunctory.
318. See, e.g., NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 377; Gray
v. Heat & Frost Insulators, Local 51, 416 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1969); Schick v. NLRB,
409 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Whiting Milk Corp., 342 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1965); Turley
v. Hall's Motor Transit Co., 296 F. Supp. 1183 (M.D. Pa. 1969); R. GoRMM, supra note 311,
at 706-07; Flynn & Higgins, supra note 311, at 1123-31.
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NFLPA and arguably are not members of the protected class. 39 This
rule, however, is not without exception. In Jones v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc.310 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated:
True, there is language in cases . . . to the effect that a union
does not commit an unfair labor practice when it discriminates
against employees outside of its collective bargaining unit. De-
spite this language, it is clear that a union may conduct itself in
a manner so arbitrary or malicious vis-a-vis an outside group that
it exceeds the limit imposed by the duty of fair representation. 3'
The key word in the court's statement is "employees." In both
Jones and Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard,3 2 a Su-
preme Court decision cited by the Second Circuit in Jones, the
controversies involved unions that, through their collective bargain-
ing agreements with the employers, attempted to eliminate or cur-
tail the opportunities of nonunion employees who, under different
job classifications, performed functions similar to those of the union
members. In Howard the Supreme Court refused to shelter a union
that represented white railroad brakemen in its attempts to have
black train porters dismissed. A union, out of racial motive, cannot
eliminate the jobs of nonunion, nonbargaining unit employees.23
Moreover, in Jones the Second Circuit extended this rationale, hold-
ing that a union could not discriminate capriciously against nonbar-
gaining unit employees whose duties were identical to those of work-
ers within the bargaining unit, whatever the motivating factor.32 1
No decisions have extended the union's duty of fair representation
to circumstances that are analogous to the NFLPA's relationship
with college draftees. A union's duty of fair representation has been
extended properly to all members of the bargaining unit, and, in
some instances, to other employees of the employer; however, it
normally does not cover other outside parties. This conclusion is not
designed to suggest that the players unions and the sports leagues
are immune from antitrust actions that may be brought by drafted
319. See Gray v. Heat & Frost Insulators Local 51, 416 F.2d 313, 316 (6th Cir. 1969).
320. 495 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1974).
321. Id. at 796 (emphasis supplied). The court in Jones nevertheless ultimately concluded
that the plaintiff nonunion employees were members of the union's bargaining unit. Id. at
797.
322. 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
323. Id. at 773-75.
324. 495 F.2d at 797-99.
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individuals. A determination of the susceptibility of leagues and
players unions to antitrust attack requires an analysis of the effects
of the collective bargaining provisions concerning the modified
player draft.
2. The Connell Balancing Test
One serious question presented by the modified ftaft is whether
the imposition of market restrictions on potential professional foot-
ball players is tantamount to a conspiracy between the union and
the club owners. Professional sports, like any business, has finite
economic resources, and the established players have a vested inter-
est in restricting the bargaining power of the rookies. By limiting the
negotiating strength of those athletes selected in the player draft,
the established players have enhanced their opportunities to
achieve their own salary demands. Also hoping to restrict the bar-
gaining powers of the rookies are club owners, especially those with
problems, such as inordinately limited financial resources or unde-
sirable team locations that diminish their abilities to attract quality
ballplayers in an open market. Some owners might believe that in
a completely free market they could not compete with clubs located
in cities offering either considerable promotional opportunities or
climates hospitable to the outdoor game of football.
Thus, the modified draft may be vulnerable to antitrust suit on
the ground that it is a conspiracy between a union and an employer
to impose market restraints. Moreover, under Allen Bradley the
NFLPA could not avoid any liability arising from such an allegation
by proving that it was acting in its self-interest."' The NFLPA and
the NFL may attempt to defend the agreement by arguing that the
conspiracy prohibition is inapplicable; the NFLPA conspired with
a nonlabor group to restrict the marketability of another labor group
rather than to affect an industrial competitor. No direct precedents
have applied Hutcheson's nonconspiracy proviso to a conspiracy
against another labor group. In Pennington the Court pertinently
stated:
a union forfeits its exemption from the antitrust laws when it is
clearly shown that it has agreed with one set of employers to
impose a certain wage scale on other bargaining units. One group
325. See text accompanying notes 144-49 supra.
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of employers may not conspire to eliminate competitors from the
industry and the union is liable with the employers if it becomes
a party to the conspiracy.2 6
Moreover, in American Federation of Musicians v. Carroll" ' the
Court granted the labor exemption to the union although the dis-
pute was between labor groups. 28
Whether a court would accept this defense, however, is doubtful.
In contrast with the NFLPA's actions, the union in Carroll did not
combine with a nonlabor group but merely unilaterally imple-
mented its own bylaws. Similarly, in deciding in Pennington and
Hutcheson that a union could not combine with one nonlabor group
to harm another nonlabor group, the Supreme Court may not have
intended to imply that the union could conspire with the same
nonlabor group to impose unfair restrictions on another labor group.
Even assuming that the Supreme Court did anticipate this result,
a plausible argument could be made that the player draft provision
was the product of an illegal conspiracy, in that the NFLPA has
combined with a nonlabor group, the NFL, to benefit the particular
team that drafted the individual player. Thus, the agreement effec-
tively eliminates competitor teams from the market for a particular
athlete who has been drafted by another club.39
The defense that the draft only restricts another labor group also
is suspect because, in the unique circumstances of professional
sports, the players are not merely the labor market but also consti-
tute the industry's product in many important respects. In most
industries consumers are not interested in the activities of particu-
lar employees; instead they are concerned only with the tangible
results of those activities. In professional sports, however, the pub-
lic's interest transcends a desire to learn the outcome of a particular
contest and encompasses a predilection for following the perform-
ances of individual athletes. Thus, in the sports industry the ath-
letes as individuals and as a team are the message, the product sold.
Although no clear defense is available to the NFLPA and the NFL
against the charge of conspiracy, such an allegation is difficult to
326. 381 U.S. at 665-66.
327. 391 U.S. 99 (1968).
328. See notes 176-82 supra & accompanying text.
329. For a discussion of whether a club injured by the operation of a sport's player restraint
system could maintain an antitrust action against its league, see Note, Professional Sports:
Restraining the League Commissioner's Prerogatives in an Era of Player Mobility, 19 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 281, 311-16 (1977).
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sustain. 3 0 The plaintiff cannot meet his burden of proof merely by
demonstrating that the interests of the union and the employer
favored the imposition of market restraints3 1 Allen Bradley in-
volved an unusual situation in that the union willingly participated
in a scheme to exclude competitors from a substantial market. In
contrast, the NFLPA forced a reluctant NFL to accept a modified
draft plan that was less restrictive than its predecessor. Moreover,
a union's participation in the regulation of entry opportunities for
newcomers is commonplace: the widespread use in some industries
of union hiring halls or union-run apprenticeship programs arguably
has the same restrictive effect as does the maintenance of the NFL's
player draft.332 As a result, allegations of conspiracy would be diffi-
cult to sustain.
If the modified draft is not overturned on a conspiracy theory, a
court must still balance the draft's antitrust considerations against
its labor law ramifications. The impact of the draft on the bargain-
ing ability of potential professional athletes is considerable. The
reduction from seventeen to twelve rounds has freed from the draft
only those players who are not particularly attractive to the owners.
Because very few late round picks ever make the team, the reduced
number of rounds has had very little practical effect in increasing
the opportunities of college athletes. More importantly, those play-
ers who would gain the most from the draft's dissolution, the college
stars, still are subjected to it.
On the other hand, the draft no longer provides a team the exclu-
sive bargaining rights to a drafted athlete in perpetuity. A player
may be prevented, however, from freely negotiating for as many as
two years. This is a significant restraint, especially because the
athlete is deprived of bargaining opportunities during two of the
best and potentially most lucrative years of his exceedingly short
career. Most athletes subject to the draft have reached their present
degree of fitness and skill after four years of apprenticeship on a
major college team, which also brought them valuable exposure in
the national media. A player who refuses to accept a mediocre offer
and who sits out from competition during the two years he is subject
330. See, e.g., Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537
(1954); United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 367 F. Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
331. See, e.g., Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
332. See generally Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. at 743; P. TAFr, ORGANIzED LABOR
IN AMERIcAN HISTORY 436 (1964).
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to the draft would not only have difficulty in maintaining his ath-
letic skills but also would be denied the valuable publicity he re-
ceived as a college star.
Thus the player draft undeniably restrains potential professional
athletes from freely bargaining in terms of salary or location. As
previously noted, this restriction affects both the labor market and
the product market because of the sports industry's unique nature.
Moreover, the means of enforcing the draft, the group boycott, is a
device traditionally disdained by the courts. 333 In Connell the agree-
ment between Connell and the union prevented the contractor from
hiring subcontractors of his choosing, which prompted the Supreme
Court to declare that "[l]abor policy clearly does not require . . .
that a union have freedom to impose direct restraints on competi-
tion among those who employ its members. ' 34 The district court in
Smith v. Pro-Football, however, concluded that the protection of
potential players is "less central" to the objectives of the antitrust
laws than is the mandate to prevent product market restrictions. 335
Such a conclusion ignores that both the union and the NFL agreed
to a modified draft lodging considerable power with the owners to
restrict the bargaining abilities of potential players and thereby to
control both the labor market and the product market. The draft,
even as modified, is inescapably a serious market intrusion on the
part of the NFL and the NFLPA. Although the arrangement may
not be the "absolutely . . . most restrictive . . . imaginable," 33 it
certainly is not the most reasonable.
In Connell the market restrictions were serious and offered no
important countervailing consideratons advancing the national
labor policy. The NFL-NFLPA agreement, however, involves defi-
nite counterbalancing labor law considerations. This contract is
unique in that it presents the first instance in which professional
football's labor and management have engaged in bona fide collec-
tive bargaining concerning the player restraints traditionally used
in the industry. Although the NFLPA has yet to demonstrate the
membership solidarity required to make it a formidable adversary
333. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion
Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); United States v. General Motors
Corp., 384 U.S. 207 (1959); note 26 supra.
334. 421 U.S. at 622.
335. See text accompanying notes 269-71 supra.
336. 420 F. Supp. at 74.
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during negotiations, the litigation strategy pursued so successfully
by professional athletes has forced the NFL to bargain seriously
about the league's player restraint mechanisms. Moreover, having
surrendered much of its traditional authority over players, the
league understandably insisted that, in addition to a no strike or
lockout clause, the agreement also contain a "no suit" clause:
[Tihe NFLPA agrees that it will not sue, nor support financially
or administratively, any suit against the NFL or any club with
respect to any aspect of the NFL rules, including without limita-
tion, the Standard Player Contract, the NFL Player Contract,
the NFL Constitution and Bylaws, the college draft, the option
clause, the right of first refusal or compensation, the waiver sys-
tem, the trading of players, tampering, and the maintenance of
certain reserve lists.3 37
The league also made clear that if the class action settlement was
disapproved by the court or if either the modified draft or the right
of first refusal/compensation system was enjoined, either party
could terminate the agreement on written notice.m
Thus, the new contract attempts to provide peace in an industry
plagued by labor turmoil during the past decade. The contract rep-
resents a significant departure from a paternalistic labor relation-
ship marked by the league's refusal to engage in serious collective
bargaining to a more mature arrangement in which representatives
of labor have an actual voice in the terms and conditions of their
employment. As the court in Smith recognized, the negotiation of a
draft provision is central to the NFLPA's purpose of forging the
groundwork for bona fide collective bargaining, and the union must
have flexibility in arriving at the best agreement it can obtain.33
Clearly, the subject matter of the draft provides the NFLPA with
one of its stronger bargaining points, and unions should have the
freedom to use this leverage to further its members' self-interests.
In the context of the entire contract, then, the draft provisions ap-
pear intimately related to the furtherance of the national labor pol-
icy of collective bargaining.
The resulting dilemma requiring balancing involves a restraint on
the market for new talent in the sports industry, enforced by a group
337. Football Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 295, art. I, § 2.
338. Id. art. XXXVI, § 3.
339. See text accompanying notes 270-71 supra.
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boycott that was negotiated by parties whose interests conflict with
those of the athletes who will be injured by the draft's operation.
Nevertheless, the modified draft also appears to be a term and
condition of employment for which the parties bargained at arm's
length in an attempt to create labor peace. The inevitable conclu-
sion is that the draft concerns the fundamental interests and poli-
cies of both the antitrust and the labor laws. As noted, however, the
Supreme Court has not decided a case involving strong antitrust
and strong labor law considerations; therefore Connell and the other
labor exemption decisions do not provide the guidance necessary for
a complete analysis of the draft. The uncertainty of the Connell
balancing test assures that the applicability of the labor exemption
to the modified player draft is an issue that can be resolved without
speculation only after the Supreme Court further delineates the
scope of the nonstatutory exemption.
B. Right of First Refusal or Compensation: The Successor to the
Rozelle Rule
Among football's player control mechanisms, the Rozelle Rule
aroused particular resentment.34 ° The players contended that the
NFL's one year reserve clause was meaningless as long as its surro-
gate, the Rozelle Rule, existed. They insisted that the Commis-
sioner's power to determine compensation served as an effective
deterrent against teams signing free agents, because a team owner
could not predict the "ransom" he would have to pay for a particu-
lar player. The collective bargaining agreement's compensation pro-
visions remove the uncertainty and arbitrariness inherent in the
Rozelle Rule, but, as with the modified draft plan, the successor
compensation system also imposes severe restraints on an individ-
ual athlete's freedom to bargain with other teams. According to the
new agreement, the amount of predetermined compensation for an
established star who is able to command a "qualifying offer" of
$200,000 or more, consists of the acquiring club's own first round
selection choices, or better first round choices it might have ob-
tained by assignment from other NFL clubs, in the next two college
drafts.341 Ultimately, the compensation plan seriously may inhibit
teams from bidding for the services of free agents. The possible
340. See notes 64-83 supra & accompanying text.
341. Football Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 295, art. XV, § 12.
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chilling effect of the predetermined compensation system may be
illustrated by the reported reaction of one head football coach:
Teams will turn their backs on expensive free agents because of
the new pre-determined compensation . . . "I know this. The
teams that needed [a particular free agent playef] the most
before the agreement . . . were not interested in that kind of
[compensaton package].
"I felt prior to the agreement that there was very little chance
of him [the particular football player] coming back here. Now
that there is an agreement, I think we'll be able to sign him. '342
Apparently, the Rozelle Rule in a modified form is incorporated
into the collective bargaining agreement. The uncertainty created
by the Commissioner's compensation power has been replaced by
the certainty of an exorbitant price that must be paid by any club
hoping to acquire the talents of a highly regarded athlete. 43 Al-
though this limitation may not be as severe in restricting the free
movement of players as was the Rozelle Rule, it nevertheless consti-
tutes a significant market restraint inhibiting teams from bidding
for the highly paid and presumably most talented athletes.
Inasmuch as the Rozelle Rule consistently had been viewed with
disfavor by the courts, the NFLPA's rationale for its agreement to
include a similar compensation provision in the new collective bar-
gaining agreement appears perplexing. The established players may
have a vested interest in retaining a modified draft, but the benefits
they receive from the maintenance of a compensation system are
unclear. The NFLPA might have concluded that an unrestrained
market is beneficial only to the superstars who already enjoy high
salaries, or it might have recognized the validity of the owners'
persistent claims that some form of player restraint system is essen-
tial to the NFL's economic well-being. The most plausible explana-
tion, however, for the union's acceptance of this provision is that it
made the sacrifice to achieve other concessions from the owners.
The NFLPA needed a collective bargaining agreement to preserve
its existence; as reported in the New York Times:
342. Philadelphia Inquirer, March 3, 1977, § C, at 1, col. 1.
343. If a club does not possess the draft choices necessary to provide the required compen-
sation, it may not acquire the free agent. Football Collective Barganing Agreement, supra
note 295, art. XV, § 12. This prohibition further restricts the movement of free agents.
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The Union, which seemed about to go under during the long
impasse, has survived. "You have no idea how close we were to
going out of business," a source close to the situation observed.
"Our membership was down to about only 300. We'd lost a strike.
There was no dues checkoff." The new contract provides the
checkoff and more importantly an agency shop.3 4
When viewed in the stark terms of the union's survival, labor law
considerations are present in the NFL-NFLPA contract. As noted
in the discussion of the draft, the NFLPA is embarking on the
creation of a bona fide collective bargaining relationship. In the
context of the remainder of the contract, the compensation provi-
sion appears to have been accepted as part of the bargaining pro-
cess, during which the league and the players forged a mutually
acceptable agreement.
Thus, as with the draft, the compensation system creates a situa-
tion involving important labor and antitrust law considerations.
The Court, however, has yet to indicate which of these public poli-
cies should predominate in such circumstances.
CONCLUSION
Both the Sherman Act and the National Labor Relations Act were
enacted amidst a concern for the abuses of big business. Although
the sports industry at first glance appears to be an unlikely arena
in which to resolve the clash between the conflicting policies under-
lying these measures, it nevertheless may be the first forum in which
Connell's balancing requirements are applied to determine whether
a market restraint that is implemented through a collective bargain-
ing agreement and that presents important labor law considerations
should qualify for the labor exemption from the antitrust laws. Un-
fortunately, the decision in Connell provides little guidance as to the
ultimate resolution of this situation. Moreover, any predictions con-
cerning the appropriate balance of these two fundamental national
policies would be speculative in the absence of a Supreme Court
decision addressing the issue. The modified player restraint system
contained in the NFL-NFLPA agreement exposes the deficiencies
of Connell, in that neither the union nor management knows
whether the contract, which was negotiated after three years of
344. N.Y. Times, March 6, 1977, § 5, at 7, col. 2.
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strenuous collective bargaining, is subject to nullification in an anti-
trust suit. Hopefully, for the welfare of the entire labor-management
community and not merely for the sports industry, the Supreme
Court will seize upon an early opportunity to define Connell's re-
quirements.
